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A common feature of all standard theories of the laws of nature is that
they are “absolutist”: They take laws to be either all metaphysically neces-
sary or all contingent. Science, however, gives us reason to think that there
are laws of both kinds, suggesting that standard theories should make way
for ‘non-absolutist’ alternatives: theories which accommodate laws of both
modal statuses. In this paper, we set out three explanatory challenges for any
candidate non-absolutist theory, and argue that neither of the two existing
candidates meets them all. We then develop our own non-absolutist theory,
the essentialist DTA account, which combines the nomic-necessitation or DTA
account with an essentialist approach to metaphysical modality in order to
meet the three explanatory challenges. Finally, we argue that the distinction
between kinematical and dynamical laws found in physical theories supports
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1 Non-Absolutism about laws
1.1 Why be a non-absolutist?
A central question in the metaphysics of science is what a law of nature is. In
the recent literature, three philosophical theories of laws of nature have established
themselves as standard theories: Dispositional essentialism, the Dretske-Tooley-
Armstrong (DTA for short) or nomic necessitation view, and Humeanism.1
A crucial point of disagreement between these theories concerns the modal status
of the laws. Dispositional essentialism tells us that the laws of nature are meta-
physically necessary, that is, necessary in a very strong sense, whereas the nomic
necessitation view and Humeanism both tell us that they are metaphysically con-
tingent. One thing which all three theories have in common, however, is that they
are absolutist : They attribute one and the same modal status to all laws of nature.2
Yet, a closer look at actual examples of physical laws casts doubts on this abso-
lutist dogma: On the one hand, certain laws simply do not seem sensible candidates
for having the status of metaphysical necessities. Among others, Tahko [2015] has
pointed out that a change in the fine-structure constant over time reported by
physicists allows us to infer to its modal variance and thereby to the metaphysical
contingency of laws involving this constant. In a similar spirit, Hendry and Row-
bottom [2009] have argued that certain scientific explanations require counternomic
possibilities, possible situations ruled out by at least some laws of nature, question-
ing the assumption that all laws are metaphysically necessary. Moreover, it is hard
to see for many law-like statements as to why they should hold with metaphysical
necessity. Just take Coulomb’s law: Why think that the force between two electrons
could not in any objective sense have been different? There are thus what appear to
be good reasons to assume, contra dispositional essentialism, that certain physical
laws are not metaphysically, but rather only nomically necessary.
On the other hand, there are physical laws which do after all seem to hold with
metaphysical necessity. An example usually provided (also by Tahko [2015]) is that
of the Pauli exclusion principle (PEP). The PEP states that no two fermions in a
1Though arguably the most popular options, those three approaches are not the only ones
available. In particular, while representing very different overall accounts of laws (e.g. as regards
modal status), all three are reductionist accounts; yet, there are also primitivist views (e.g. Carroll
[1994], Maudlin [2007]), and eliminativist views (for two eliminativist views based on radically
different motivations, see van Fraassen [1989b], and Mumford [2005]).
2Although primitivism about laws does not seem to imply any answer to the modal question—
in principle, a primitivist could be a necessitarian or a contingentist, or even a non-absolutist
—, the main existing primitivist views are also absolutist, taking all laws to be contingently
existing/obtaining entities/facts that cannot be further metaphysically accounted for in terms of
something else (Carroll [1994], Maudlin [2007]).
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closed system can occupy the same quantum state at once. According to Tahko, the
principle can be seen to hold in virtue of the nature of fermions.3 This would make
the PEP an example of a metaphysically necessary law, as long as one presupposes
the commonly held view that propositions which hold in virtue of the nature of
something express metaphysical necessities. (Cf. Tahko [2015], p. 524-5.) In fact,
it seems that the PEP qua law-like statement is just so centrally constitutive of
fermions that we could take it to specify a constraint on any admissible way our
universe could objectively have been in the presence of fermions, giving us another
reason to think that it holds with metaphysical necessity.4
Hence, there are reasons to explore non-absolutist alternatives to the standard
theories, that is, theories of the laws of nature which allow for both metaphysically
contingent, as well as metaphysically necessary laws of nature. This paper con-
tributes to this project, but it also adds its own twist to it. Existing arguments for
non-absolutism are formulated in a naturalistic spirit. They in particular rely on
relevant scientific knowledge in order to establish a philosophical conclusion. This
paper is written in a similar spirit, but unlike Tahko and Hendry and Rowbottom,
our reliance on science goes beyond that of treating it as a source for counterex-
amples to absolutism. We follow them in proposing a non-absolutist theory of the
laws which is at its core purely philosophical. We also agree with their assessment
that Coulomb’s law and the PEP are examples of metaphysically contingent and
necessary laws respectively. Yet, we also argue that there is an established physical
distinction, the distinction between kinematical and dynamical constraints, which
can, in conjunction with philosophical considerations, a) serve as a motivation for
non-absolutism about the laws of nature, thus giving us a more systematic, less
intuition-dependent motivation for non-absolutism, and b) provide a criterion for
the metaphysical necessity of certain laws. Physics thus contributes more to our
constructive philosophical proposal than it did in previous works on non-absolutism;
and, in this sense, our paper could be called more naturalistic.
In the rest of this section, we will first identify three main explanatory chal-
lenges that any non-absolutist view of the laws has to address (§1.2). We will then
argue that the two main available proposals for non-absolutist views, Tahko’s and
3This formulation – and similar formulations to follow – is to be understood in the sense of
“in virtue of the nature of the natural kind fermions”, not as ‘in virtue of the nature of individual
fermions”.
4This point about the PEP may appear to be at odds with the previous claim that Coulomb’s
law is metaphysically contingent: Why should Coulomb’s law not be taken to hold just in virtue of
the nature of electrons and other charged particles? Whereas Tahko [2015] motivates the claimed
difference in modal status merely intuitively (based on whether a law features a fundamental
natural kind), we will show in section 3 that it can in fact be accounted for based on the different
statuses that those two laws have within physical theorising itself.
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Hendry and Rowbottom’s, fail to meet at least some of them or require controversial
assumptions about properties, respectively (§1.3). Based on these considerations,
we will then develop our own proposal for a non-absolutist view—a modified ver-
sion of the standard DTA-view, according to which the relevant relation of nomic
necessitation between the universals involved in a law may hold either metaphysi-
cally contingently (as it does according to the standard account) or metaphysically
necessarily. As we will argue, this account can meet all of the three metaphysical
challenges in a natural and straightforward way (§2). Finally, we will further de-
velop our proposed non-absolutist view by showing how it can, in addition, meet the
epistemological challenge of providing a reliable, scientifically informed criterion to
determine which laws are metaphysically necessary and which laws are metaphys-
ically contingent. Our proposed criterion will rely on the kinematical/dynamical
distinction, which is familiar from physical theorizing (§3). We will end with some
concluding remarks. (§4)
1.2 What a non-absolutist theory should explain
It is a common feature of the main absolutist theories of laws of nature that their
explanations of what a law of nature is also fixes whether the law is metaphysically
necessary or contingent. Dispositional essentialists hold that laws of nature describe
the causal powers of things. This implies that all laws are metaphysically necessary,
given that powers are essentially connected to the causal roles that they play, and
that all entities possess their essences with metaphysical necessity. (See e.g. Bird
[2007], Ellis [2001].) According to the DTA view, or nomic necessitation view, laws
of nature are only nomically, but not metaphysically necessary, since they capture
a nomic necessitation relation which metaphysically contingently holds between
universals. (See e.g. Armstrong [1983], Dretske [1977], Tooley [1977]). Finally,
Humeanism also tells us that laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Ac-
cording to Humeans, laws of nature are axioms of our best systematization of all
the non-modal facts about the world, and these facts could (in the metaphysical
sense) have been different. (See e.g. Lewis [1973].)
Compared to these theories, a non-absolutist theory which admits both meta-
physically contingent and metaphysically necessary laws faces different explanatory
challenges. First, it has to account for two sorts of necessity with which the laws
may hold: metaphysical necessity and nomic necessity. For, once metaphysical ne-
cessity has been accounted for, nomic necessity does not just come for free. Unlike
mere accidental generalizations, which are also metaphysically contingent, meta-
physically contingent laws are still supposed to be nomically necessary. And this
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other form of necessity also needs to be explained. Thus, a non-absolutist view
should really provide us with two explanations: It should tell us for both meta-
physical and nomic necessity where these kinds of necessity find their source in.
Needless to say, this explanation should be a plausible one. In particular, the view
should make it clear why the proposed source is relevant to the kind of necessity
considered, and it should not yield counterintuitive results regarding the extent of
that kind of necessity—e.g. it should not entail that any true or false proposition
whatsoever has that modal force.
Second, the respective explanations of metaphysically and nomically necessary
laws provided by a non-absolutist theory should be ‘synchronized’, in the sense that
laws should not be attributed conflicting modal statuses. In particular, the theory
should ensure that both metaphysically contingent and metaphysically necessary
laws are always nomically necessary. This second challenge mainly concerns the
relation between nomic necessity and metaphysical necessity, and more specifically
how their respective extents harmonize.
It is worth expanding a bit on this challenge, which we may call ‘the synchroniza-
tion challenge.’ How can a non-absolutist theory address it? Let us first consider
a theory which posits two distinct sources for the two sorts of modality. Generally,
if these sources are genuinely independent, then there seems to be no direct way
for the theory to ensure that they assign harmonious modal statuses to a law (or
to any related proposition more generally): If the two sources are genuinely inde-
pendent, then that means that the modal status which is assigned to a law by one
source is not in any way constrained by the modal status assigned to it by the other
source. To ensure that the two sources are in sync, one would thus need to posit
a third factor which has the power to constrain both sources of modality. Plau-
sibly, this third factor would need to be modal too—it could perhaps consist of a
logical (meta-)modality which ensures the logical consistency of the modal statuses
assigned to laws by the two sources. This, however, raises the question of why this
third kind of modality has a constraining power over other sources of modality.
Difficult questions of this sort are avoided by non-absolutist theories which do
not posit two distinct sources of modality, but rather claim that the one kind of
modality which applies to the laws can actually be understood in terms of, or derived
from, the other. According to such a theory, there is, fundamentally, only one source
of modality. The most straightforward way to implement this idea in the context of
a non-absolutist theory is to think of the nomic possibilities as a proper subset of
the metaphysical possibilities. If one’s account yields this result, the two kinds of
modality cannot conflict in the described way, because each nomic possibility is also
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a metaphysical possibility, which means that metaphysical necessity implies nomic
necessity.5
Generally, it seems that an answer to the synchronization challenge is much
easier to come by if one adopts a one-source view. A non-absolutist theory based
on such a view may e.g. explain all modality in terms of truth in possible worlds, in
terms of essences, or of powers. It is much less clear whether and if so how a theory
based on a two-source view of the two kinds of modality could guarantee that no
multi-modal incoherences arise.
Third, since non-absolutist theories of laws draw a line between two distinct
classes of laws—those which are metaphysically contingent and those which are
metaphysically necessary—there is a risk that such a theory may fail to deliver a
unified account of what all laws of nature, whatever their modal statuses, have in
common, i.e. of what, in general, makes a law a law. Here is how Bartels [2019]
expresses the worry:
. . . this move [to a non-absolutist theory of laws] would then require, first
of all, some different demarcation criterion of lawhood (with respect to
empirical regularities) which would be independent from metaphysical
necessity/contingency, i.e. we should be able to know, whether some
empirical truth is a law of nature or not, independently of whether it
holds by metaphysical necessity or not. (Bartels [2019], p. 10)
Bartels’ requirement seems justified: There should be a common account of
lawhood which is independent of modal status, in the sense that it goes beyond the
trivial stipulation that the laws are those law-like statements which are nomically (or
metaphysically) necessary, and, one may add, which is not merely disjunctive. The
need to provide such an account seems particularly pressing given a non-absolutist
view of the laws.
In sum, a non-absolutist view of the laws faces three specific challenges:
1. The double explanatory challenge: The view should account for both of the
potential modal statuses of the laws, i.e., metaphysical necessity and nomic
necessity.
5This would make, using Hale’s terminology, metaphysical necessity at least as strong as, and
indeed stronger than, nomic necessity. According to Hale [1996], p. 94, a kind of necessity 1
is stronger than a kind of necessity 2 if, and only if, for all p, 1p → 2p, but not for all p,
2p → 1p. Dispositional essentialists, in particular, reject the idea that metaphysical necessity
is stronger in this sense than nomic necessity, since they identify the two kinds of necessity.
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2. The synchronization challenge: The view should exclude inadmissible combi-
nations of metaphysical and nomic modal statuses of a law, such as a meta-
physically necessary law’s being nomically contingent.
3. The common lawhood criterion challenge: The view should provide a non-
disjunctive account of lawhood which does not simply identify a law of nature
with a nomically or metaphysically necessary generalization.
With that being said, we will now turn to the two non-absolutist theories of
laws that have been proposed in the recent literature, and discuss whether they can
meet those three challenges.
1.3 Existing proposals and their problems
1.3.1 Tahko’s hybrid view
Tahko [2015] contains, to the best of our knowledge, the first suggestion of an
explicitly non-absolutist theory of the laws proposed in the literature. While the
paper does not develop the theory in enough detail to directly assess its ability to
meet the three challenges set out in the previous section, it is worth discussing the
theory’s core idea and how it could be further developed to meet the challenges.
Tahko clearly indicates what he takes to be the source of metaphysical necessity
for any laws of this status. The core assumption of his view is that a law of nature
is metaphysically necessary if it features a fundamental natural kind and that it is
metaphysically contingent if it does not. (See Tahko [2015], p. 518.) According to
Tahko, the PEP, for example, has the former modal status, since it expresses an
essential truth about the kind fermion, whereas Coulomb’s law lacks this status,
since there is no plausible candidate for a natural kind whose essence is captured
by this law.6
Tahko is, however, less clear about why both metaphysically necessary and con-
tingent laws are still nomically necessary. He approvingly refers to Birds’ description
of Armstrong’s idea that nomic necessities are ‘soft’, or in Tahko’s preferred ter-
minology, ‘weak’ necessities which are characterized in terms of their explanatory
force and ability to support counterfactuals. (See Bird [2005], p. 148.) As Tahko
points out, this characterization naturally aligns with a Humean view of the laws,
but he also mentions, without going into any detail, the possibility that the nomic
necessity of the laws may be explained in terms of them featuring natural proper-
ties, as opposed to natural kinds. (See Tahko [2015], p. 519.) In the following, we
6See Tahko [2015], pp. 516f, 524f.
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will briefly discuss how Tahko’s hybrid view could be further developed along either
of these two lines and argue that neither developement results in a non-absolutist
theory which is able to meet the explanatory challenges mentioned in §1.2.
We can be relatively brief with the first suggestion, viz., that of relying on a
Humean account of the laws to explain their nomic necessity. The resulting theory
would both be hybrid in the sense that it allows for both metaphysically necessary
and contingent laws (this is Tahko’s intended sense of ‘hybrid’) and in the sense
that it involves two distinct sources of modality, the essences of natural kinds and
the status of being axioms in the best systematisation of all scientific truths about
the actual world.7 So understood, the view meets the first explanatory challenge
since it specifies the sources of metaphysical and nomic necessity.
As we have pointed out earlier, a non-absolutist theory which posits two gen-
uinely independent sources of modality will likely have difficulties guaranteeing
modal harmony between the nomic and metaphysical modal status of a law. The
doubly-hybrid version of Tahko’s theory is a case in point. If we assume that a
particular law involves a natural kind in the sense envisioned by Tahko, then this
does not at all guarantee that the law is also an axiom (or theorem) of the best
system (nor does the converse hold). There is no good reason to think that the
theory-intrinsic aspects responsible for making a law an axiom of the Humean best
system (usually assumed to be: simplicity, fit, and explanatory strength) harmo-
nize with a theory-independent, purely ontological inventory of kinds. Hence, the
doubly hybrid theory does not meet the second challenge.
And, finally, given that the doubly hybrid theory posits two fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of laws—those flowing from the essences of fundamental natural kinds
and those which are axioms of the best system— it is at best unclear how it could
meet that third challenge, viz. that of providing a non-trivial common criterion for
lawhood.
Let us now briefly consider Tahko’s second suggestion, namely that some laws
are metaphysically necessary because they involve a natural kind, whereas others
7One can arguably read Tahko’s view in a more epistemic fashion: the best-system view, unlike
an essentialist view, of the laws is then not seen as accounting for the ‘objective’ laws of nature,
but rather providing (epistemic, practical) criteria for us to best systematize the regularities in
the world. This would mean that Tahko’s view does not immediately face the synchronization
problem which is a purely metaphysical worry (likewise for the disjunctiveness concern mentioned
below). Note that this reading of the best systems account (BSA for short) as epistemic in nature
is non-standard, since it does not give us the deflationary ontic account of laws delivered by the
standard version of the BSA, and that we take Tahko indeed to be interested in an ontic hybrid
law account. Note also that this epistemic take on the BSA would leave the metaphysical question
about the ontic status of the laws unanswered. Thanks to Valentina Luporini for pointing this
out to us.
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are metaphysically contingent, but still nomically necessary, because they merely
involve a natural property instead. The problem with this second proposal is that it
is not at all clear how the distinction between natural kinds and natural properties
is supposed to make a difference regarding the modal status of the laws. After
all, Tahko’s view tells us that the metaphysical necessity of the laws featuring
natural kinds is due to their essences, which natural properties presumably also
have. But essence cannot do the trick, since essentiality implies metaphysical, not
mere nomic necessity, no matter whether the relevant essence is that of a natural
kind or a natural property. Relying on essence as the source of nomic necessity
would thus turn the theory into an absolutist view, according to which all laws
are metaphysically necessary. Alternatively, one might posit a second source of
necessity distinct from essence in order to account for the nomic neccessity of the
laws. But this sort of account would then bring us back to the same problems which
plague the doubly-hybrid version of the hybrid theory.
To sum up, we do not see how either one of Tahko’s two suggestions could yield
a non-absolutist theory which successfully meets all the explanatory challenges for
non-absolutist accounts.
1.3.2 Hendry and Rowbottom’s dispositional contextualism
The non-absolutist theory of Hendry and Rowbottom [2009] is a more permissive
version of dispositional essentialism called dispositional contextualism. They moti-
vate their theory by arguing that there are legitimate scientific explanations which
involve counternomic possibilities, i.e., possible worlds in which some laws fail to
hold. Standard dispositional essentialists cannot admit such possibilities, since ac-
cording to them, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, that is necessary in
the strongest sense, which means that there are no counternomic possibilities.
Like standard dispositional essentialists, Hendry and Rowbottom subscribe to an
anti-quidditist account of properties according to which properties play their nomic
roles essentially. According to this account, something can, for example, only be
water if it has the same dispositional profile as actual water. If implemented in
the way that standard dispositional essentialism does, anti-quidditism implies that
the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary: Properties possess their disposi-
tional profiles with metaphysical necessity, laws of nature capture these profiles,
and therefore, the laws of nature turn out to be metaphysically necessary—that is,
they hold in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Hendry and Rowbottom resist this implication by adopting a non-standard view
of properties, which provides the central building block of their dispositional con-
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textualism. According to this view, dispositional properties have two particular fea-
tures: they are (i) context-sensitive and (ii) vague. That they are context-sensitive
implies that ‘having a property P may involve manifesting M in response to S in
some contexts, but manifesting M 1 in response to S in other contexts, where such
contexts are possible worlds.’ (Hendry and Rowbottom [2009], p. 673.) According
to dispositional contextualism, dispositional properties really consist of the differ-
ent dispositional profiles which the objects with this property exhibit relative to
different possible worlds. This means that they are cluster properties, collections
of world-bound properties, each of which has a dispositional profile in its respective
world. What ties the world-bound properties together are counterpart-relations,
i.e. cross-world relations of similarity between them. (Cf. Hendry and Rowbot-
tom [2009], p. 674.) In case of the water-property, for example, the bundle would
consist of an actual-world-water-property which has water’s dispositional profile
with respect to the actual world (which would be complex, capturing all of wa-
ter’s actual dispositions) and of one world-relative water property for each possible
world—some of which are, according to Hendry and Rowbottom, not identical to
the actual-world-water-property. Hendry and Rowbottom’s idea is that this allows
water to have a different dispositional profile relative to some possible worlds. For
instance, in some other possible world, the dispositional profile of water might omit
the disposition of actual H2O molecules to enter into hydrogen bonds with other
molecules containing highly electronegative atoms, including other H2O molecules.
To pick up their example, assuming that it is an actual law of nature that hydrogen
bonding occurs,8 this law will not hold in such a world, since it does not apply to
H2O molecules in that world.
But what allows a dispositional contextualist to claim that in such a possible
world, water is still water, even though it fails to display (parts of) its characteristic
dispositional behaviour? This is where the vagueness of the properties comes into
play.
Dispositional cluster properties consist of a set of world-relativized dispositional
profiles and counterpart-relations which, so to speak, glue them together. These
relations play the same role in Hendry and Rowbottom’s theory as they do in their
original context, Lewis’s metaphysics of modality:9 They provide one with some-
thing similar, but not quite the same as numerical identity. All the core differences
to identity can be traced to the fact that counterparthood is a matter of overall
8Slightly more precisely: that a pair of a hydrogen atom which is covalently bonded to an
electronegative atom in a molecule and another electronegative atom in the same or another
molecule may enter into electrostatic dipole-dipole interaction.
9See Lewis [1968, 1986].
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similarity between objects; in the case of dispositional contextualism, these objects
are dispositional profiles, or the associated world-relative properties. Whether a dis-
positional profile (or the associated property) and another are counterpart-related
is a matter of how similar they are. Hence, water, conceived of as a dispositional
cluster property, can have a dispositional profile which deviates from water’s actual
dispositional profile regarding e.g. its boiling point relative to a counternomic, but
metaphysically possible world, since that profile is still overall similar enough to
water’s actual dispositional profile for the former to be a counterpart of the lat-
ter. The price to pay for this flexibility is that of it being a vague matter when
a world-relative dispositional profile stops being overall similar enough to qualify
as a counterpart of e.g. the dispositional profile of water in the actual world. (Cf.
Hendry and Rowbottom [2009] p. 676.)10
Dispositional contextualism is designed to account for the metaphysical possi-
bility of counternomic worlds and correspondingly also for the metaphysical con-
tingency of some laws of nature. Metaphysically contingent laws are laws which
capture the dispositional profiles of the relevant property in some possible worlds,
but not in others.11 The theory can furthermore easily account for the metaphysical
necessity of some laws of nature: The property underlying such laws has a constant
dispositional profile relative to all metaphysically possible worlds.12
Can dispositional contextualism meet the explanatory challenges which we raised
for non-absolutist theories of laws of nature? To answer the question, we have to
go beyond the suggestive, but rather piece-meal theory Hendry and Rowbottom
present. In particular, we need to specify how dispositional contextualism handles
nomic necessity. We will do so by supplementing the theory with the standard view
that nomic necessity amounts to truth in all nomically possible worlds, where a
10Note that, as Hendry and Rowbottom [2009], pp. 674-5 point out, this does not mean that
dispositional contextualists are forced to follow along a sorites series of ever so slightly different
dispositional profiles which leads them into paradox (cf. Hyde and Raffman [2018]). A sorites
series of this kind could for example start with the claim that water has its actual dispositional
profile with respect to the actual world and proceed, step-by-step, to the claim that relative to
some other possible world, it has the dispositional profile of a completely different substance, e.g.
that of sodium chloride. The intransitivity of the counterpart relation guards their theory against
this rather disastrous outcome.
11Since Hendry and Rowbottom explicitly take dispositional essentialism as their starting point,
we assume that their theory inherits the dispositional essentialists’ assumption that there is at
least one property which supports the truth of a law with respect to all possible worlds in which it
holds. In theory, they could also allow laws which are supported by some property in some worlds
and by others in other worlds.
12To be more precise, the profile is constant with respect to those of its dispositional features
connected to the law. If there are any, other dispositional features of the property which are
unconnected to the law may of course still vary. The same holds for metaphysically contingent
laws with respect to the set of the nomically possible world. We will leave these specifications
implicit in the following when mentioning constant dispositional profiles.
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nomically possible world is one in which the same laws of nature hold as in the
actual world. Speaking in terms of Hendry and Rowbottom’s cluster properties,
these worlds are just those for which a relevant class of cluster properties (e.g.
made relevant by their fundamentality) contain the same dispositional profile as
they do for the actual world.
With this account of nomic necessity in hand, we can now take stock. Disposi-
tional contextualism can indeed meet the first challenge, since it provides an account
of both metaphysically necessary laws and merely nomically necessary laws: meta-
physically necessary laws express truths about dispositional properties which have
a constant dispositional profile across all metaphysically possible worlds; merely
nomically necessary laws express truths about dispositional properties which have
a dispositional profile which is constant across all nomically possible worlds, but
varies in counternomic metaphysically possible worlds.
Dispositional contextualism is also able to meet the synchronization challenge,
i.e. the second challenge, since it presumably posits only one source of necessity
for the laws, the essences of the dispositional properties which give rise to them. In
particular, the nomic necessity of any metaphysically necessary law is guaranteed
by the fact that the underlying dispositional cluster property exhibits a constant
dispositional profile across all metaphysically possible worlds: a dispositional profile
of this kind holds also throughout all nomically possible worlds, since they are a
subset of the metaphysically possible worlds.
What about the third challenge—that of providing a common, non-disjunctive
criterion for lawhood which is independent of modal status? Since the theory is
a variant of dispositional essentialism, one natural idea would be to rely on the
(dispositional) essences of properties to provide such a criterion. Following this line
of thought, one might for example say that the PEP is a law because it expresses an
essential truth about the property of being a fermion. However, while this criterion
may work well for dispositional essentialists, dispositional contextualists would face
serious problems if they relied on it.
First, it is unclear whether, talk of essences of dispositional cluster properties
even makes sense, since they are mere bundles of pairwise similar world-relative dis-
positional profiles held together by counterpart relations. What could the essence of
such a bundle be, given that the bundle may encompass very different dispositional
profiles across worlds? Since it is not clear how dispositional contextualists should
answer this question, it seems that they cannot simply rely on the lawhood criterion
provided by dispositional essentialism.
Second and even more importantly, the dispositional essentialists’ lawhood cri-
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terion would immediately turn Hendry and Rowbottom’s theory into an absolutist
view. Unlike dispositional essentialists, dispositional contextualists also have to ac-
count for metaphysically contingent laws—a task for which essence seems simply
unfit: since essentiality entails metaphysical necessity, any lawlike generalization
which expresses an essential truth about a property thereby also expresses a meta-
physical necessity.
In order to avoid these problems and to make room for metaphysically contingent
laws, dispositional contextualists may adopt a modified lawhood criterion, based on
a different take on the essences of their dispositional cluster properties: The starting
point would be the claim that what is essential to the relevant dispositional cluster
property is not a single, general, and world-independent dispositional profile which
could directly ground a law. Rather, the idea is that the property has all of its world-
relative dispositional profiles essentially: For instance, it would then be essential
to water that it has its boiling point of 100◦C (ceteris paribus) relative to the
actual world, and that it has a certain lower boiling point of say, 80◦C (under the
same conditions), relative to a particular counternomic world, and so on for all the
other possible worlds. Accordingly, what is rendered metaphysically necessary by
a dispositional cluster property’s essence is not directly a law, but rather the fact
that this property has these dispositional profiles relative to the relevant worlds. As
a result, the drawback of relying on essence mentioned above is avoided: a law-like
statement does not have to be metaphysically necessary anymore to be a law. For
a true generalization to be a law, it suffices that it is essential to that property
that it has a pertinent dispositional profile relative to the actual world—which is
compatible with it being essential to that property that it has a different profile
relative to some other possible worlds.
Although that modified lawhood criterion, unlike the standard dispositional
essentialist criterion, avoids the consequence that all laws are metaphysically neces-
sary, it still faces a problem, namely that it makes it unclear what role essence would
even play in the account. For according to it, the essence of such a property fixes
the whole set of world-relative dispositional profiles which belong to the property,
which means that all the work in settling the modal status of the laws is already
done at this point. If a property has a dispositional profile which is constant relative
to all worlds, the corresponding law will be metaphysically necessary; if not, the
law will be merely nomically necessary. It is then unclear how essence is supposed
to contribute to accounting for the modal status of laws.
In that respect, dispositional contextualism, based on the lawhood criterion un-
der consideration, would be very different from standard dispositional essentialism—
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arguably more so than what Hendry and Rowbottom suggest. According to stan-
dard dispositional essentialism, what is essential to the relevant property is a specific
dispositional profile; and that profile holds in all possible worlds because it is essen-
tial (absolutely, not relative to some worlds) to the property to have that profile.
Thus, essence clearly accounts for the modal status of the law: It is metaphysically
necessary because it is essential to the property. But on the picture suggested by
the modified criterion, things are quite different: A property already encodes all
of its world-relative dispositional profiles; and those already tell us whether a law
will be metaphysically necessary or not. The only further modal role which essence
could play in this picture is that of accounting for a ‘second-order’ modality: The
fact that this set of world-relative profiles is essential to the relevant property may
be taken to account for the fact that, whatever modal status this set gives to a law
(metaphysical necessity or mere nomic necessity), the law has that modal status
essentially, hence with metaphysical necessity—i.e. it is metaphysically necessary
that the law is metaphysically/nomically necessary. But explaining the necessity of
the necessity of a law is evidently a far cry from explaining why the law is a law in
the first place.
In sum, it seems that a lawhood criterion based on the essence of properties
would be problematic for dispositional contextualists. However, the previous dis-
cussion suggests that they could opt for a criterion for lawhood which is not based
on essence at all. Not only would this allow them to avoid the problems just men-
tioned, but more generally, getting rid of essence would be a quite natural move
considering the apparent mismatch between the highly context-dependent and flex-
ible counterpart relation on which their view decisively relies, on the one hand,13
and the absolute and rigid notion of essence usually posited by contemporary es-
sentialists (and in particular by dispositional essentialists), on the other hand.
The idea would be to simply say that laws are true generalizations that are
due to some property, in particular to its whole set of world-relative dispositional
profiles. More specifically, for a generalization to be a law, it has to be the case
that the generalization expresses a dispositional profile (e.g. boiling at 100◦C under
normal conditions) that a property (e.g. water) has relative to the actual world.14
An essence-free criterion of this sort appears to provide dispositional contextual-
ists with an acceptable answer to the third explanatory challenge for non-absolutist
13Cf. the discussion of Chisholm’s paradox and the essentiality of origin in Lewis [1986], pp.
243ff. See also Paul [2004] for discussion.
14There is of course more to be said about this sort of criterion. For example, one important
question about it is which sorts of dispositional properties support laws of nature in the suggested
way. A natural idea would be to assume that only perfectly natural properties play this role.
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views, giving them a lawhood criterion which is non-disjunctive and common to
all laws of nature, whether metaphysically necessary (supported by a dispositional
cluster property with a dispositional profile which is constant through all possible
worlds) or merely nomically necessary (supported by a dispositional cluster property
which is constant throughout some worlds).
We have just argued that, after a bit of work, dispositional contextualism is able
to meet all three explanatory challenges for non-absolutist theories. Still, there are
good reasons to search for alternatives. Dispositional contextualism stands and falls
with Hendry and Rowbottom’s non-standard account of dispositional properties.
This account is not likely to find broad acceptance among philosophers. For one, it
requires one to accept that there are vague properties. This is a highly controversial
claim which conflicts with the widely accepted view that ‘[t]he only intelligible
account of vagueness locates it in our thought and language.’ (Lewis [1986], p.
212.)15 As we have just argued, in order to meet the third explanatory challenge,
dispositional contextualists may also have to strip their account of a core ingredient
of dispositional essentialism, namely the essences of dispositional properties, even
though the former was supposed to offer a non-absolutist alternative to the latter
theory. Where should philosophers who have sympathies for non-absolutism, but
prefer a more conservative metaphysics of properties turn then? Tahko’s view does
not meet all of the the explanatory challenges, so what is the alternative?
2 The essentialist DTA account of laws
Since one of the two extant non-absolutist theories of the laws of nature does not
meet the explanatory challenges and the other one relies on a controversial view
of properties, we should search for alternatives. The aim of the remainder of the
paper will be to propose and further explore such an alternative. In this section,
we will focus on the purely metaphysical aspects of the proposal, viz., on laying
out an account of the laws of nature which makes room for non-absolutism about
the modal status of the laws and which meets the explanatory challenges faced by
any non-absolutist view. In the following section, we will then broaden the focus
to the epistemological question of how we can find out whether a law is necessary
or contingent. For this, we shall develop a naturalist criterion for detecting the
modal status of a given law which naturally complements the metaphysical account
suggested in this section.
15But note that there is a recently growing discussion of metaphysical indeterminacy which
questions the orthodoxy. See e.g. Barnes [2010], Calosi and Mariani [forthcoming], Smith and
Rosen [2004], and Wilson [2013].
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Our account takes its point of departure from one of the standard accounts of
laws in the literature, viz., the nomic necessation view, which is also called the ‘DTA
theory’ after its main defenders David Armstrong (1983), Fred Dretske (1977, 1987)
and Michael Tooley (1977). Our proposed account modifies the DTA theory in two
major respects in order to make room for metaphysically contingent and necessary
laws and we will also argue that it can solve a major problem which the original
theory faces. We begin with an outline of the standard version of the theory (§2.1),
go on to present our own version of the account (§2.2), and finally show how it can
meet the explanatory challenges for non-absolutist views (§2.3).
2.1 The standard DTA account
The core idea of the DTA account is that laws of nature are due to a second-order
relation of nomic necessitation – or, for short, “N -relation” – that holds between
universals.16 Whether properties stand in this relation is taken to be a matter
of contingency. That is, some property F may stand in the relation to G in our
world,17 and yet fail to stand in it in some other world:
Contingent Holding: N(F ,G)→ ¬N(F ,G).
The proponent of the DTA account then takes the instantiations of N to be
intimately connected to first-order regularities regarding the related universals in
the following way: Whenever F stands in N to G, all F s are Gs:
Implication: N(F ,G)→ ∀x(Fx→ Gx).18
The claim about a material implication between the holding of N -relations and
the corresponding generalizations raises the question of the modal robustness of
the implication: Do we encounter this implication only in our world, or in others
as well? And, in particular, does the implication hold in all possible worlds? The
latter claim would amount to:
16We follow Tooley in taking the laws of nature to be universal generalizations which are due
to the N -relation, rather than the states of affairs of the N -relation holding between universals
themselves. Armstrong and Dretske adopt the latter view, by contrast. Universals still have an
important role to play in our theory, however (see §2.2).
17In what follows, we use letters such as ‘N ’, ‘F ’ and ‘G’ – as opposed to the predicate-letters
‘N ’, ‘F ’ and ‘G’ – as singular terms for properties.
18In our discussion, we focus on deterministic laws for the sake of simplicity. The account could
be generalized to also capture probabilistic laws, however. In the case of a probabilistic law,
we have various possible outcomes G1x,G2x etc. that follow from Fx with certain conditional
probabilities p1, p2, ... To account for such laws, one might, for instance, postulate a multiplicity
of N -relations that each has an associated conditional probability — which, in the limit case of a
deterministic law equals 1. Then, we could model the case of a probabilistic law as one in which
F stands in N1 to G1, in N2 to G2 etc.
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Necessary Implication: (N(F ,G)→ ∀x(Fx→ Gx)).
(Necessary Implication) is a very natural claim to endorse given (Implication).
Do the three main proponents of the standard DTA account actually endorse (Nec-
essary Implication)? Tooley holds that the conditional is logically necessary, which
would imply its metaphysical necessity. Things are slightly less clear with Arm-
strong and Dretske. Armstrong [1983] maintains that ‘it seems that we will have
to say that the entailment holds in virtue of a de re necessity linking the relation
between the universals, on the one hand, and the uniformity it ‘produces’, on the
other.’ (p. 86). But at the same time, he claims that N is a ‘relation of contingent
necessitation’, which might be read as a denial of the principle. Finally, while the
analogies that Dretske [1977] draws between the workings of N and legal codes sug-
gest that he endorses (Necessary Implication) (cf. p. 264), he does not explicitly
commit to it.
No matter, however, whether it is maintained that we have this relationship of
entailment (i.e. necessary implication) or not, the laws of nature will turn out to be
metaphysically contingent according to the original DTA account. Given that it is a
matter of contingency whether the relevant properties stand in the N -relation in the
first place, it follows that it is a matter of contingency whether the corresponding
generalizations obtain. The original DTA account is thus clearly a contingentist
absolutist view.
There are arguably two major challenges for the DTA account, the form of the
law problem and the inference problem.19
Let us start with the form of the law problem. This problem departs from the
observation that, on the face of it, (virtually) none of the laws as described by cur-
rent physics seem to match the ‘all F s are Gs’-pattern. In particular, physical laws
typically describe functional relationships between values of properties. This point
seems rather obvious and can already be acknowledged without having to rely on
much empirical consideration; still, it is arguably best seen through actual examples
of laws from current physics. For instance, take our previous two main examples:
The PEP has it that no two fermions can have the same quantum numbers in a
closed system, and Coulomb’s law has it that the electrostatic components of force
between two electrons is proportional to the product of each other’s charge accord-
ing to the equation FQ = Fq = 14πε0
Qq
r2
. None of them looks, on the face of it, like
having the form ‘All F s are Gs’. But if laws of nature like these do not fit this
19Another important problem is the identification problem (see van Fraassen [1989a], p. 97):
What does the N -relation consist in? In general, the question of what sort of relation N is
supposed to be has so far received no precise and convincing answer. We will provide one through
our essentialist DTA-account below though.
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pattern, then the DTA account would seem to be inadequate, or so the worry goes.
This topic has sparked much controversy, with many options outlined in the
literature and no stable agreement reached.20 Offering a comprehensive discussion
of all these options and their respective merits and drawbacks would already suffice
to fill a paper on its own. Given that our focus in this paper is a rather different
one—viz., to show how a hybrid account of laws can be developed based on the
DTA account—we cannot provide such an overarching discussion here. What we
will thus do instead is to merely put forward one way in which the problem can be
addressed. This option draws on the discussion in Friend [2016], but has, to our
knowledge, not yet been discussed in the context of the DTA account. We would
like to stress, however, that this proposed solution is a purely optional element of
our overall account, and that the reader should feel free to replace it by her preferred
take on the form of the laws problem.
Based on a consideration of a variety of laws in physics and other sciences,
Friend [2016] argues that all laws of nature are of a conditional form, and, more
precisely, of the form ∀x(Fx → Gx). In this schema, the ‘F ’ corresponds to what
one may call a general condition that a physical/chemical/biological/. . . system of
interest has to fulfil to be subject to the overall (higher-order) behavioural property
expressed by functional relations between first-order properties (encoded by G). His
basic argument in favour of this view is that functional laws on their own are just
mathematical tautologies; they need to be made sense of by qualifying under which
conditions they apply to which entities in the world, that is to which sort of system.
This required qualification, however, automatically engenders that law statements
are conditionals. (The only exception here would be given by functional relations
that apply under all conditions to any kind of objects; Friend is quick to point out
that current physics does not provide us with any sensible candidates for non-trivial
functional laws of such a sort.)
Our proposal based on this argument is then straightforward: The properties
related by the N -relation correspond to the F and G in Friend’s account.21
20See, for instance Armstrong [1983], Tooley [1987], Forge [1986] and Maudlin [2007]. Tooley in
particular provides a solution to the form of the law problem which could serve as an alternative
to the solution which we will now propose.
21One might worry that this account has it that quite complex—and thus presumably non-
natural/non-fundamental—properties are taken to be N -related and to thus figure in the (sources
of) the physical laws. However, we can think of no way of rendering this objection more precise
that strikes us as compelling. First, pace the assumption that such complex properties do not even
exist or are no ‘genuine’ properties, see e.g. Bealer [1982] and Bealer and Mönnich [1989]. Second,
we take Hicks and Schaffer [2015] to have ruled out the idea that only fundamental properties can
feature in the laws of physics. And third, in response to the worry that some N-facts are plausibly
fundamental and that our proposal thus conflicts with Sider’s purity principle—according to which
only fundamental entities can figure in fundamental facts—we would like to point out that the
20
To illustrate how Friend’s account works, let us return to our two main examples.
Following Friend, Coulomb’s law may then be more explicitly taken to say that all
two-charge systems will experience electrostatic components of force proportional




Consequently, the proposed account maintains that this law is due to the N -relation
holding between the property F of being a two-charge system on the one hand, and
the property G of experiencing electrostatic components of force proportional to




the other. Pauli’s exclusion principle says that all closed systems containing two
fermions will be such that there is some difference in the quantum numbers of the
two fermions. On our account, F would thus correspond to the property of being
a closed system with two fermions, and the property G to the property of being
such that there is some difference in the quantum numbers of the two fermions. In
sum, the proposed account can accommodate laws of any given form, regardless of
whether they involve functional relationships or not. And thus, the account evades
the form of the law problem in a straightforward and fully general way.
The second of the two commonly mentioned problems for the DTA theory is the
so-called inference problem—which is more directly relevant to our main concern in
this paper, namely the modal status of the laws, than the form of the law objection.
While the name traces back to van Fraassen [1989b], Lewis [1983] provides the iconic
formulation of the problem for Armstrong’s account:
“Whatever N may be, I cannot see how it could be absolutely impossible to
have N(F,G) and Fa without Ga. [...] The mystery is somewhat hidden by
Armstrong’s terminology. He uses ‘necessitates’ as a name for the lawmaking
universal N; and who would be surprised to hear that if F ‘necessitates’ G
and a has F, then a must have G? But I say that N deserves the name of
‘necessitation’ only if, somehow, it really can enter into the requisite necessary
connections. It can’t enter into them just by bearing a name, any more than
one can have mighty biceps just by being called ‘Armstrong’.” (p. 366)
The question raised here is this: Why does F ’s and G’s standing in the N -relation
entail, i.e. necessarily imply, that all F s are Gs? The answers that have been
purity principle is itself contentious and faces serious difficulties (see e.g. Merricks [2013]). While
a more thoroughgoing defense of the proposed move would be certainly preferable, we have to
leave this to another occasion. The reader who is not convinced by the considerations in this
footnote, however, should feel free to adopt one of the other alternatives regarding the form of the
laws challenge, such as those proposed by Armstrong [1983] or Tooley [1977].
22In direct analogy to Friend [2016], p. 134: “Newton’s law of gravitation is a conditional which
states that all two-mass systems will experience gravitational components of force proportional to
the product of each other’s mass according to the equation FM = Fm = GMmr2 .”
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suggested in the literature fall into broadly two camps.
The first variety of answers, which may be labelled ‘heavyweight solutions’,
seek to explain the entailment by substantive metaphysical theorising concerning
the nature of universals and states of affairs (Armstrong [1983], Armstrong [1983],
Armstrong [1997], Tooley [1987] (labelled Tooley’s ‘speculative solution’)). These
proposed solutions, however, are commonly taken to be affected by severe problems
and ultimately unpromising.23 ‘Lightweight solutions’, on the other hand, account
for the entailment simply by maintaining that it forms part of the DTA theory’s
very own theoretical posits, i.e., the axioms stipulated by the theory. While Tooley
[1987] himself proposes such a solution (the ‘solution by stipulation’) as well, he sees
it as unsatisfactory on its own, and thus in need of being amended by the speculative
solution. Schaffer [2016], by contrast, argues that the lightweight solution is already
sufficient: According to him, the proponent of the DTA account need not do more
than to invoke (Necessary Implication) as an axiom of her overall theory, full stop.24
Drawing on this distinction between heavyweight and lightweight solutions, we
might conceive of the crucial question underlying the inference problem as follows:
Is there a metaphysical explanation for the entailment and if so, what is it? Then,
the inference problem itself might be seen as the following worry: The claim that
N(F ,G) entails that all F s are Gs is not a good candidate for a metaphysical
stopping point and there is no good candidate for something that metaphysically
explains it either—due to additional, specific commitments of the DTA theorists, or
maybe even for fully general reasons. Seeing the dialectics in this way, it seems that
merely pointing out that this claim is an axiom of the DTA theory does not help
much to dispel the worry behind the inference problem. While it might indeed be
considered a legitimate move to invoke this claim as an axiom rather than to offer
an explanation of it, the specific worry would still stand. Moreover, taking a stance
regarding the question of whether this claim is a brute truth or has a metaphysical
23In particular, Armstrong [1983]’s solution, according to which the N -states of affairs are at
the same time universals, has the disadvantage that, as Armstrong puts it himself, “Logicians are
inclined to protest on this point.” (p. 90). For objections to Tooley’s speculative solution, see
Sider [1992].
24One may distinguish two senses in which (Necessary Implication) might be regarded as a ‘fair
stopping point’: The first is that of a metaphysical stopping point, i.e., a brute truth that simply
lacks any deeper metaphysical explanation. If (Necessary Implication) was such a legitimate
stopping point on this understanding, no further metaphysical account of why it holds could be
given even in principle – there would simply be nothing more which could be said. The second kind
of a legitimate stopping point, by contrast, would be a methodological one, i.e., a stopping point
just because one has to stop somewhere (the foundationalist’s dilemma) and which is, nevertheless,
acceptable in terms of philosophical theory building. If (Necessary Implication) were a legitimate
stopping point thus understood, its proponents would not need to offer a further explanation of
why it holds, even though such an explanation could potentially be given; they would simply be
free to refrain from saying more.
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explanation in other terms seems generally preferable in order to have a ‘full-blown’
account of the laws of nature. Thus, when developing our own version of the DTA
theory in the following section, we also take up the task of offering an answer to
the inference question.
2.2 The essentialist DTA account
As we have seen, the fact that all laws turn out to be contingent on the DTA
account is due to the fact that whether properties stand in N -relations is contin-
gent, plus potentially the idea that N(F ,G) merely implies but does not entail (i.e.
necessarily imply) that all F s are Gs. Our proposal about how to make room for
both metaphysically contingent and necessary laws within the DTA account is then
quite simple: We propose to maintain first that N(F ,G) entails that all F ’s are G’s,
and, second, that merely some universals stand contingently in N -relation, while
others do so necessarily. That is, our account replaces (Contingent Holding) with
the following thesis:
Mixed Holding: ∃X1,Y1(N(X1,Y1) &  ¬N(X1,Y1)) & ∃X2,Y2 N(X2,Y2).
In words: There are some properties which stand in the N -relation, but which do
so only (metaphysically) contingently, and there are others which necessarily stand
in the N -relation. Given (Necessary Implication), lawlike generalizations that are
due to a contingently holding N -relation thus turn out to be contingent, while laws
that are due to a necessarily holding N -relation turn out to be necessary. In this
way, the account naturally gives rise to a non-absolutist view of the modal status of
laws. In our two main example cases, for instance, the relevant properties F and G
would be taken to stand necessarily in the N -relations in the case of the PEP, and
merely contingently in the case of Coulomb’s law. And thus, the PEP turns out to
be necessary, while Coulomb’s law turns out to be contingent, just as they should.
There is now, however, the further question of what the sources of the necessi-
ties in (Mixed Holding)—and prior to this—in (Necessary Implication)—are. Our
preferred answer to both is in terms of essence.
More specifically, in the case of (Necessary Implication), we propose that neces-
sity is due to the essence of the N-relation.25 Grounding the necessity in (Necessary
Implication) in the essence of the relevant N -relation is to say that it is part of the
very nature of N that it gives rise to the corresponding regularities. Letting the
operator ‘xxφ’ stand for ‘it is essential to xx that φ’, where xx may range over
25Which means that our account differs from the absolutist account presented in Swoyer [1982]
which relies on the essences of properties, not the essence of the N-relation.
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objects, properties, or a plurality of objects, a plurality of properties, or of both,
we thus have:
Essence of N : N (N(F ,G)→ ∀x(Fx→ Gx)).
In words: It is essential to N that, if F stands in the relation N to G, then
everything which is F is G.
Moreover, we combine this essentialist claim with the (by now well-established)
view that essence is not to be analysed in modal terms, but that it is rather essence
which is a source of modality.26 In particular, according to the resulting account,
xxφ metaphysically explains φ for any xx and φ, since it specifies the source of
the metaphysical necessity of the latter claim. In this way, (Essence of N ) yields a
straightforward explanation of why (Necessary Implication) holds, thus providing
an answer to the inference problem.27, 28
In the case of (Mixed Holding), we also wish to propose that the notion of
necessity at play is grounded in essence. Here, the idea is that some properties
stand essentially in N -relations, while others do so merely accidentally:
Mixed Essential Holding: ∃X1,Y1(N(X1,Y1) & ¬∃xxxxN(X1,Y1)) &
∃X2,Y2 X2,Y2N(X2,Y2). 29 30
26See Fine [1994] for the idea that modality is analysable in terms of essence rather the other
way around, and Fine [1995], Correia [2012] and Michels [2019] for discussions of the reduction of
metaphysical modality in terms of essence.
27An essentialist solution along these lines is already hinted at in Barker and Smart [2012].
They reject it, however, apparently based on the idea that, (a), the essentialist claim would have
it that the two facts [N(F ,G)] and [∀x(Fx→ Gx)] are identical, and (b), that the proponent of
the DTA account should not take these facts to be identical (pp. 720f.). But while we are happy
to grant (b), we can see no good reason to endorse (a).
28Furthermore, (Essence of N) also provides an answer to the related identification problem of
the DTA account. (Cf. again van Fraassen [1989a], p. 97.) In fact, it is unsurprising that our
proposed view provides an answer to both problems at the same time. For on this view, what the
N-relation is amounts to what it does: the N-relation just is the relation that makes the instances
of its first relatum always come with instances of its second relatum. Note, in particular, that
this answer to the identification problem avoids the difficulties faced by Armstrong’s suggestion
that N may be identified with ‘the causal relation’ (see Armstrong [1993], p. 422.): on our view,
causation can perfectly well be understood as a relation between concrete particulars – rather
than between (both concrete particulars and) universals –, and the resulting account of the laws
is perfectly compatible with there being causal as well as non-causal laws.
29Note that incidentally, Armstrong himself uses the essentialist form of words ‘what it is to
be a. . . ’, which led Aristotle’s roman translators to coin the term ‘essence’ in the first place, to
explain what the source of the necessity of the laws is: ‘We are now saying that, for it to be a law
that an F is a G, it must be necessary that an F is a G, in some sense of ‘necessary’. But what is
the basis in reality, the truth-maker, the ontological ground, of such necessity? I suggest that it
can only be found in what it is to be an F and what it is to be a G.’ (Armstrong [1983], p. 71.)
30We are assuming the rather common view that essence is monotonic: if a proposition Φ is
true in virtue of the essence of some plurality of entities xx, and yy is a plurality that contains xx,
then Φ is also true in virtue of the essence of yy (see Fine [1995], Zylstra [2019]). However, one
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In words: There are some properties which stand in the N -relation, but whose
standing in that relation is not essential to anything, and there are others which
essentially stand in the N -relation. (Mixed Essential Holding) provides us with
a straightforward, and, we think, very natural explanation of (Mixed Holding):
The former part of the condition—viz., ∃X1,Y1(N(X1,Y1) & ¬∃xxxxN(X1,Y1))—
provides for the contingency of some properties’ standing in a N -relation, while the
latter part – viz., ∃X2,Y2 (X2,Y2N(X2,Y2)) — provides for there being properties
which stand essentially, and thus metaphysically necessarily, in them. Coming back
to our two main example cases, the account would thus maintain that, in the case
of the PEP, the relevant properties F and G stand essentially in the N -relations.
In the case of Coulomb’s law, by contrast, we would have that, even though the
relevant properties F and G stand in the N -relations, it is not part of the essence
of them, or any other plurality of entities, that they do so.
Now, our account, as it stands, leaves it open whether, in the case of the PEP,
the essence is ultimately a joint essence of both F and G, or merely one of the
two. A closer look at the properties involved, however, makes it plausible that the
ultimate essence bearer is F alone if our solution to the form of the laws problem
is assumed. To see this, recall that, following Friend, we take F to be a property
that picks out the relevant sort of system—in the case of the PEP, the property
of being a two-fermion system—and G a property that corresponds to what the
law says about systems of this sort—for the PEP, the property of being such that
the fermions do not have the same quantum numbers. In this case, it seems very
plausible that it is already essential to F alone that it stand in N to G. Moreover,
we will also see in §3 that a careful investigation of our physical theories speaks in
favour of this conclusion. That being said, however, we want to keep our overall
account neutral with regard to the question of whether we should adopt this specific
solution to the form of the laws problems and thus conceive of F and G in this way.
may have independent reasons to think that essence is non-monotonic (see Michels [2018]). And
if such a view were assumed, (Mixed Essential Holding), in its current form, may be problematic:
In particular, we should not exclude the possibility that, for some or indeed all metaphysically
necessary laws, the N -relation holds in virtue of the essence of only one of the universals involved.
For instance, it is arguably a metaphysically necessary law that fermions cannot share the same
quantum numbers (PEP), but it is plausible that the N -relation between the property of being
a two-particle fermion system and the property of the system that the constitutive fermions
display different quantum numbers holds in virtue of the essence of the former property alone.
Thus, if we wanted to make our account compatible with a non-monotonic understanding of
essence, we would have to modify (Mixed Essential Holding). Yet, the relevant modification
would be minor, leaving the core ideas behind our account untouched. We would just have to
replace (Mixed Essential Holding) with the slightly more complex (Mixed Essential Holding*):
∃X1,Y1(N(X1,Y1) & ¬∃xxxxN(X1,Y1)) & ∃X2,Y2 (X2,Y2N(X2,Y2) ∨ X2N(X2,Y2) ∨
Y2N(X2,Y2)).
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And therefore, we formulate (Mixed Essential Holding) in a way that is neutral with
regard to whether F , G or both taken together the ultimate bearers of the essence.
It is worth noting that in endorsing the essentialist line of response to the in-
ference problem, we have to eschew Armstrong’s quidditist account of properties.31
Note, however, that the commitment to quidditism is by no means an integral part
of the DTA account as such, but rather a separate commitment which Armstrong
takes up for independent reasons. Hence, quidditism is a purely optional element
for the proponent of the DTA account, and endorsing the DTA account should not
by itself compel us to be sceptical about essence.
One might object to the proposed account that, even when constructing a non-
absolutist view of laws, as soon as we help ourselves to essence, adopting the nomic
necessitation account in addition would look like a bad idea for reasons of ideological
parsimony: A purely essentialist account would seem to be sparser than an account
that invokes both essence and the N -relation, and thus, other things being equal—
and, in particular, if it could also account for different modal statuses of laws—
preferable. But this is, so far, wishful thinking: As we have seen in §1.3, the
two essentialist non-absolutist views of laws proposed thus far both fail to meet
the three explanatory challenges for such accounts. Hence, in the absence of a
purely essentialist non-absolutist account which proves otherwise, other things are
not equal, and the criterion of parsimony does not enter the picture. Rejecting the
proposed account on the basis of parsimony considerations would thus be misguided.
Finally, it is worth stressing that, beyond the essentialist understanding of meta-
physical necessity, various alternative accounts would be available – e.g. reduc-
tionist accounts based on possible worlds (Lewis [1986]); counterfactual accounts
(Williamson 2007; Lange [2009]), non-reductionist views (Forbes [1989]; Wang
[2013], Wilsch [2017]); and conventionalist views (Sidelle [1989]; Sider [2011]). A
foe of essence could thus instead invoke one of these accounts in order to explain
the necessities in (Necessary Implication) and (Mixed Holding). Moreover, we do
think that it would also in principle be viable to simply take the relevant neces-
sities to be brute necessities. While such a move arguably stands in tension with
further commitments of DTA—such as, Hume’s dictum (i.e., the ban on necessary
connections among distinct entities) and the thesis that only analytic truths can
be necessary—these further commitments do not form an integral part of the DTA
view as such, and are rather further optional commitments. (See Hildebrand [2013]
for discussion.)
31Bird [2005] claims that the conflict with quidditism already arises as soon as (Necessary
Implication) is endorsed. But as Coates [2019] points out, the conflict only arises if the essentialist
claim is endorsed, assuming a non-modal account of essence.
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That being said, however, it should be clear that there are advantages for not
taking the necessities to be brute. First, by instead providing an (essentialist)
explanation for the necessity in (Necessary Implication), one is able to provide an
answer to the inference problem. Second, there are considerations that tell in favour
of invoking essence to account for the necessity in (Mixed Holding): As we will argue
in section 3, a careful investigation of physical theories suggests that metaphysically
necessary laws indeed express essential features of the properties that are N -related.
Thus, while we take essence to be an in principle optional element of the account
as presented in this section, we think that there are good reasons to endorse it.
2.3 How the essentialist DTA account meets the explanatory
challenges for non-absolutist theories
Let us now see how our proposed amended DTA view can meet the challenges set
out in §1.2. First, the proposed view can easily avoid the synchronization problem.
Nomic necessity, on our view, is naturally understood as a conditional, or relativized
form of metaphysical necessity: metaphysical necessity given all the actual instances
of the N -relation holding between universals. More precisely, a nomically necessary
proposition p is one that follows, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, from the
proposition, Φ, which says that N holds between F1 and G1, N holds between F2
and G2, and so on, where the (Fi,Gi)s are all the pairs of universals related by N .
Using ‘’ as the sentential operator expressing metaphysical necessity and ‘’ to
express nomic necessity, we can thus define:
Definition: nomic necessity p := (Φ→ p) 32
32This simple account (see Hale [1996] for the standard version according to which nomic ne-
cessity is a relativized form of logical necessity) has faced objections. Two of them are due to Fine
[2002] (see Leech [2016] for responses). First, defining necessities by relativization, one may end up
with ‘cheap’ kinds of necessities – e.g. the necessities about your desk, defined as the propositions
metaphysically/logically entailed by the basic truths about your desk. As Leech [2016] (§2.2) notes
in response, however, we can reasonably distinguish between necessities that are indeed “cheap”
in this sense and necessities that are not, because the corresponding relativization basis is not
purely arbitrary but clearly significant. On her view, such a significant relativization basis for
nomic necessity is given by the laws of nature themselves; on our view, it is given by proposition
Φ, the conjunction of all N -propositions (i.e. propositions of the form <N holds between F and
G>). A second worry is that, on the standard relativization account, the laws of nature come
out as nomically necessary trivially, by mere self-entailment: For every conjunct λ ∈ Φ, we have
λ, by the logical form of the definition. Yet, the objection goes on, one would expect the reason
for a law’s being nomically necessary to amount to something more substantial and not just to
a trivial logical implication of the definition of nomic necessity. It is worth noting that our pro-
posed account does not face this worry (in the same way): on our view, laws themselves are not
nomically necessary by mere self-entailment, but because they are entailed by the N -propositions,
and this entailment has a metaphysically more substantial explanation based on essence which is
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In words: p expresses a nomic necessity if, and only if, (per definition) it is meta-
physically necessary that if the actual N -relations hold, then p. It clearly follows
that the metaphysical necessities form a subset of the nomic necessities, so that,
trivially, any metaphysically necessary law will also be a nomically necessary law.
As a result, our proposed non-absolutist view of the modal status of the laws easily
avoids the synchronization problem.
Second, and relatedly, our view meets the challenge of explaining, not only why
both sorts of laws are nomically necessary but also why some laws are metaphys-
ically necessary and others metaphysically contingent (double explanatory chal-
lenge). Both sorts of laws are nomically necessary because both are metaphysically
entailed by the holding of the N -relation between the universals that are actually
N -related – proposition Φ above. What distinguishes the metaphysically necessary
laws from the metaphysically contingent ones is that the former, unlike the latter,
are also metaphysically entailed by the empty set of propositions. And this, in turn,
is naturally explained by the fact that, in the case of metaphysically necessary laws,
but not in the case of metaphysically contingent laws, the N -relation between the
universals involved holds as a matter of metaphysical necessity (because it holds in
virtue of the essence of these universals).
Third, our proposed view provides us with a criterion to distinguish all laws
of nature, whatever their modal status, from the other true universal generaliza-
tions (common lawhood criterion challenge): A law of nature, independent of its
modal status, is a universal generalization of the form ‘All F s are Gs’ such that
the universals involved, F and G, are N -related. By contrast, the universals in-
volved in an accidentally true generalization which is not a law are not N -related.
For instance, the proposition that all electrons have negative charge is putatively a
true universal generalization, indeed a law of nature,33 because the two properties
captured by our principle Essence of N . More recently, other objections have been addressed by
Bob Hale and Jessica Leech (Hale and Leech [2017]). We will not discuss them here; suffice it
to say that Hale and Leech propose a refined version of their definition of nomic necessity which
avoids all those worries: p := ∃q1, . . . , qn(Π(q1), . . . ,Π(qn)) & ((q1& . . .&qn)→ p), where  is
the logical necessity operator, and “Π(q)” may be read as ‘It is a law of physics that q’. To avoid
those same problems, we could endorse the same refined definition, except that  would be the
metaphysical necessity operator, and “Π(q)” would stand for ‘q is an N -proposition’. On such an
account, it may no longer be the case that all metaphysical necessities are automatically nomic
necessities (see Hale and Leech [2017], §7). It will be the case if, and only if, there is at least
one N -proposition. Yet, this poses no problem for our account. First, what really matters, for
our account to avoid the synchronization problem, is that all metaphysically necessary laws are
nomically necessary. And this cannot fail to be the case on our view: if there is any metaphysically
necessary law, then there will be a corresponding N -proposition. Second, in the context of our
discussion, it is anyway tacitly assumed that there are at least some laws (given non-absolutism,
at least two), and thereby at least some N -propositions.
33See Wolff [2013] and Linnemann [2020] for discussion.
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involved are N -related. By contrast, the proposition that all gold spheres are less
than 17 kilometres in diameter may be a true universal generalization, but as the
property of being a gold sphere and the property of being less than 17 kilometres
in diameter fail to be N -related, it is not a law of nature. Thus, our account offers
a clear criterion for lawhood which is neither solely dependent on the modal status
of the laws, nor merely disjunctive.
3 Linking the essentialist DTA account back to physics
The essentialist DTA account provides a metaphysical framework that explains how
laws can have different modal status. In the previous sections, we have argued that
this account does not suffer from the problems which affect previously proposed non-
absolutist accounts. Remember, however, that the main motivation for introducing
a non-absolutist account of the laws of nature is naturalistic: As stressed in both
Tahko [2015] and Hendry and Rowbottom [2009], science gives us reasons to reject
the absolutist view of the modal status of the laws of nature forced upon us by
standard theories of the laws like dispositional essentialism. A central question
that remains to be addressed is thus: Is the essentialist DTA account in line with
this naturalist approach? While giving a wholly general answer to this question
(i.e., an answer which takes into account potential laws of nature from all relevant
scientific disciplines) is beyond the scope of this paper, we will give a partial answer
by focusing on the laws of physics.
With respect to physics, the main claim of non-absolutist theories such as the
essentialist DTA account is that there is a two-fold distinction between those laws
of physics which are merely nomically necessary and those which are metaphysi-
cally necessary. This means that a non-absolutist account can, given our restricted
focus, only count as adequate from a naturalistic point of view if our best phys-
ical theories indeed suggest that physical laws are necessary in these two distinct
senses. In this section, we will make two interrelated points then: First, that the
kinematical/dynamical distinction—a distinction that lies at the heart of physi-
cal theorising— directly aligns with a two-fold distinction between laws which are
necessary in a weaker and in a distinct stricter sense. Second, that the kinemati-
cal/dynamical distinction at least strongly suggests that the stricter kind of neces-
sity is metaphysical necessity.34 Before, we want to quickly address two in-principle
34Note that this gives us a response to the problem for non-absolutist accounts raised in Shoe-
maker [1980], section IX, that of them not being able to provide a principled way to distinguish
between nomically and metaphysically (‘logically’ in Shoemaker’s terminology) necessary laws.
Our response is based on the idea that the criterion Shoemaker asks for can only be provided by
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worries about referring to metaphysical necessity in the context of physical theories.
3.1 Physical laws and metaphysical necessity
How in general can it happen that certain statements of a physical theory can
express metaphysical, rather than merely nomic necessities?35 Proponents of a
non-absolutist view have to provide a satisfying answer to this question and, as
the question insinuates, they cannot do so. Physical theories do not explicitly talk
about modality, so this worry must be founded on an underlying philosophical view.
The view in question has it that metaphysical necessity is absolute, in the sense
that a proposition p can only count as expressing a metaphysical necessity if its
negation expresses an impossibility in any sense of ‘impossible’. One may after all
argue that laws of physics can never count as metaphysically necessary, since it is
easy to find a sense in which their negation expresses a possibility, e.g. because it is
logically consistent or conceivable in some possibility-conducive sense. Notably, a
view of this sort, which is crucially based on the idea that the notion of possibility
is constrained by a liberal principle of recombination, was proposed by Lewis (see
Lewis [1986], section 1.8.) and also provided the basis for Armstrong’s theory of
modality (Armstrong [1989]). It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the essentialist
DTA account is based on a rejection of this view of metaphysical modality.36 Its
essentialist component places restrictions on the recombinability of the building
blocks of reality, including in particular those imposed by the essential relations
between properties linked by metaphysically necessary laws. Such relations neither
hold as a matter of logic, nor can they be established on a purely a priori-basis.
Accordingly, we, like many other philosophers who work with a substantive notion
of metaphysical modality (cf. Gendler and Hawthorne [2002]), deny that the logical
consistency or conceivability of a state of affairs is sufficient for its metaphysical
possibility and hence reject the view in question.
The second and related worry concerns the fact that actual laws in physics
are always posited as part of physical theories. Theories have specific ranges of
applications, e.g. applying at a particular scale, and they are, at least in principle,
revisable. But given that metaphysical necessities are supposed to express theory-
independent and unrevisable truths, how then could an actual physical law ever
attain this status?
reasoning informed by the structure of physical theories.
35We take it to be uncontroversial that all physical laws are at least nomic necessities.
36Arguments against the view have for example been given in MacBride [1999], Fritz [2017], and
Wang [2016].
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Let us first point out that the notion of metaphysical modality was from the
very start explicitly introduced as an objective, worldly notion in opposition to
views of modality which equated it with a priority or analyticity. In the book which
did the most to re-establish a metaphysical notion of modality, Naming and Neces-
sity, Kripke explicitly embraces the idea that certain physical statements express
metaphysical necessity.37 According to the classic Kripkean view, when making de
re metaphysical modal claims about a natural kind, such as e.g. electron, we do
not refer to some possible kind which resembles, or in some other way corresponds
to the actual natural kind. Rather we make those very same kinds part of the
possible worlds relevant to our modal claims by stipulation. One way to spell out
the implications of this view for the laws of nature has it that laws of nature are
metaphysically necessary, because they capture the essences of natural kinds. These
essences have modal import in the sense that they constrain the space of metaphys-
ical possibilities by ruling out those possibilities which fail to conserve the actual
essential properties of those natural kinds.
While we do of course not accept this particular approach to the necessity of the
laws, which after all amounts to a version of dispositional essentialism, we accept
the underlying idea that it is part of the very idea of metaphysical necessity that
(certain) physical laws can in principle capture essential traits of the actual world,
or entities in it, which serve as constraints on the extent of what is and what is not
metaphysically possible. We in particular align ourselves with the broadly Kripkean,
essentialist view of metaphysical modality developed by Fine, Lowe, Correia and
others which we worked with in the previous section.38 But the question re-arises:
Are we justified to assume that the laws of current physical theories capture such
essential traits?
There are different ways to respond to this question. First, one might concede
that there is currently no such justification, but assert that the laws of physics which
earn the status of metaphysical necessities are laws of an ideal, completed theory.39
The underlying move of referring to a final, completed physics is a standard move
made by many naturalistically minded philosophers.This response is conservative
from a metaphysical perspective, since it respects the mentioned standard assump-
tions about metaphysical modality and the corresponding views about essence. Its
37See e.g. the discussion of light and heat in Kripke [1980], p. 128.
38See e.g. Fine [1994], Lowe [2008], Correia [2006].
39We take the omnipresence of the kinematical/dynamical distinction in physical theories—
which is argued for explicitly in a subsequent section and the appendix—to strongly suggest that
a putative final theory will showcase such a distinction just as well. Needless to say, we will not
be able to avoid the pessimistic charge by McKenzie [2019] that the extrapolation might fail—but
no naturalised metaphysics project interested in fundamental ontology can.
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drawback is that it entails that all concrete discussions which treat current physical
laws as laws of nature are merely tentative and potentially subject to later revision.
A second, less metaphysically conservative response is to adopt a non-standard,
relativized notion of metaphysical necessity which affords this status to theory-
relative and potentially revisable claims like the current laws of physics. Some
steps towards a view of this sort have been taken in the literature (see Murray
and Wilson [2012]), but further work for which this paper is not the right place is
needed to flesh out this response. A naturalistically acceptable non-absolutist view
may incorporate either of these responses.40 While we have confined ourselves to
considerations of a more general sort in this subsection, a more specific discussion
in light of the kinematical/dynamical distinction will follow later in this section.
3.2 The kinematical/dynamical distinction introduced
As we will argue in the remainder of §3, at a theory-relative level, the distinction
between kinematical vs. dynamical structure à la Curiel [2011, 2014, 2016] does
not only suggest the adequateness of a non-absolutist account; it can at the same
time also serve as a criterion for which laws can count as metaphysically necessary
(they are part of the kinematical structure of the theory), and which laws can at
most count as nomically necessary (they are part of the dynamical structure of the
theory).
Generally, Curiel characterises the kinematical/dynamical distinction as the dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, mere states of a system (which can involve
both time-independent and time-dependent quantities) as well as their constraints
(called ‘kinematical constraints’) and, on the other hand, context-dependent restric-
tions (including possible evolution) of such states (over and above the kinematical
constraints, referred to as dynamics).41 More precisely, kinematical constraints as
opposed to dynamical structure refer to concrete relations in terms of the basic
kinematical variables that are invariant across all possible models of the theory (cf.
40There might be an alternative which strikes a compromise between the two mentioned posi-
tions. Bartels proposes to relativize essences to explanatory goals instead of theories, where an
explanatory goal is pursued by scientists in a cumulative succession of increasingly precise theories,
each providing us with a more precise picture of what the essences of entities in our world are.
According to this view, essence, and thereby the notion of metaphysical necessity, is relativized to
a larger explanatory project, but not to a specific theory within that project. See Bartels [1996],
§2. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this view.
41The distinction arguably resembles Earman’s ‘constraint vs. dynamical equation’ distinction
(see Earman [1995]). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us. Although we
follow Curiel here (see also next section), at the end of the day our metaphysical proposal is inde-
pendent of whether the distinction from physics in question is called the ‘kinematical/dynamical’
or the ‘constraint/dynamical’ distinction.
32
Curiel [2016]). The term ‘concrete relation’ contrasts with ‘placeholder relation’,
that is, a relation that features quantities that still need to be fixed in terms of
the basic kinematical variables. In a 1-dim. theory of Newtonian mechanics with
basic variables x and v, ẋ = v is a concrete relation, and the force law F = mẍ a
placeholder relation; the concrete form of F still needs to be fixed further in terms
of the basic variables x, v and certain constants—as for instance done by setting
F := Gm1m2
x2
in certain scenarios—cf. [Curiel, 2016, p. 5]). (Clearly, a non-trivial
placeholder relation can thus only be dynamical but not a kinematical structure as
it will not be the same for all models to begin with.)
A good illustrative example of the distinction in use is in the context of Maxwell
electrodynamics.42 The two homogeneous Maxwell equations
∇ ·B = 0
∇× E + ∂B
∂t
= 0
are the same for any model of Maxwell electrodynamics when expressed in terms of
basic dependent variables E and B and independent variables x, y, z, t. In contrast,
the other two Maxwell equations (dubbed ‘inhomogeneous’)







differ from model to model depending on which external charge density ρ and cur-
rent J are chosen as sources. Thus, contra common presentation, two of the four
Maxwell equations are in fact kinematical and not dynamical according to the dis-
tinction as drawn by Curiel.
At this point, it is important to stress that the notion of kinematics has to
be distinguished from the notion of ‘kinematics’ qua subdiscipline as common in
the context of (classical) mechanics. The sense in which Curiel (and we) use the
term ‘kinematics’ is in terms of kinematical structure of a physical theory. This is
arguably also the standard usage of the term outside of classical mechanics, say in
quantum mechanics and GR.43 In our eyes, Curiel can take credit for providing the
42Cf. Curiel [2016].
43Needless to say, these two notions of kinematics are not unrelated: everything one does in
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only explicit account of the distinction despite its omnipresence in the practice of
physical theorising (see next subsection).
How to think of kinematical constraints over and above their characterisation
through form invariance? Kinematical constraints are statements which are needed
to minimally pick out the systems of interest to be described by the theory before and
in virtue of which dynamical evolutions can be set up. In other words, kinematical
constraints are necessary conditions for dynamical equations—in fact, for the theory
as a whole—to be about something. This can be understood merely semantically,
or, and that’s what we are after, ontologically.
We claim that (i) the kinematical/dynamical distinction à la Curiel is om-
nipresent in our best physical theories (see the next subsection and the appendix;
we can of course not provide fully detailed case studies for all relevant physical
theories here but just a caleidoscopic overview). Secondly, we claim that (ii) the
kinematical/dynamical distinction à la Curiel can naturally be taken to motivate a
non-absolutist account of the modal status of physical laws, if one is open to accept
an account of the modal status of laws in the first place. In light of (ii) then, our
attempt to find an attractive non-absolutist account of laws is promoted from a rich
conceptual exercise to a stab at the very nature of reality.
No matter whether we are interested in reading out metaphysics from our best
physical theories, or probing the adequateness and usefulness of certain metaphysi-
cal concepts in the face of them—we need to be clear at each relevant length/energy
scale which theories are our best physical theories:44 Although from a textbook per-
spective the choice of a best theory (interpretation) seems unambiguous at many
scales, surely the situation is not that simple at a second glance. Newtonian me-
chanics, for instance, has several formal representations partly different in scope
of application (Newtonian force representation; Lagrangian representation; Hamil-
tonian representation; and even a spacetime representation) that in many cases
should go along with different forms of theory interpretation. Needless to say, the
issue of underdetermination does not improve when moving towards theories of the
quantum realm.
Nevertheless, we can always try to make observations on what all these different
theories and their interpretations have in common and meta-inductively infer that
kinematicsdiscipline, that is, analyse what describes motions and their constraints is concerned with
the kinematicskinematical structure of a physical theory.
44More precisely, we need to be clear about our best physical theories qua interpreted formalisms.
This being said, the formalism of a physical theory should be taken seriously as a guide towards
an interpretation in the first place. Otherwise, we are always at danger of baking strong meta-
physical presuppositions into the theory to begin with—thereby making the project of naturalised
metaphysics overly circular.
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future physical theories display these commonalities as well. And indeed, such an
observation is suggesting itself with respect to what is generally called the kinemat-
ical/dynamical distinction: The current omnipresence of a kinematical/dynamical
distinction across theories (as indeed prompted through claim (i) once established)
motivates the assumption of a kinematical/dynamical distinction with respect to
our future best physical theories yet to come, in turn suggesting modal pluralism
among the laws of physics (provided claim (ii) holds).
3.3 Kinematical constraints across physics
The kinematical/dynamical distinction in the sense of Curiel is relevant for all
physical theories that deal with physical processes, i.e. classical theories, (general)
relativistic theories, and quantum mechanical theories. For instance, in general
relativity, spacetime structure is usually seen to become (partly) dynamical — as
opposed to kinematical in special relativity; in quantum gravity, one talks about
solving kinematical as opposed to dynamical constraints, etc. To make this point
explicitly, we have compiled several instances of kinematical constraints across the
board of various spacetime theories, including a quantum gravitational one, in the
appendix. Although not a complete list, the choice is in so far representative as
it includes instances of non-relativistic, relativistic, and quantum physics. Even if
the reader may not wish to consult the admittedly quite technical appendix and
trust us in our judgement here, it is important to appreciate the following specific
lesson from it: what one calls ‘kinematical’ and ‘dynamical’ depends on the theory-
interpretation at stake, and cannot be merely based on joined formal structure
shared across different interpretations of one and the same ‘theory’.
Our analysis in the appendix grounds another significant observation: By noting
the unbroken presence of the distinction throughout our past, current and candi-
dates for best physical theories, one can defend that the specific extrapolation from
available physics to future physics is much more stable than a naive meta-induction
from the metaphysics of our currently best physical theories alone as to what the
putative metaphysics of an (expected) final theory could be. This is an important
point as in particular McKenzie [2019] has argued against the reliability (if not even
possibility) of metaphysical extrapolations from current physics to a (fundamental)
metaphysical structure.
More precisely, McKenzie has the concern that metaphysical statements are not
statements prone to approximation but rather yes-or-no-affairs (think of structural-
ism as the idea that there are no extrinsic properties, for instance) whose answers
can putatively wildly oscillate across theory changes. Although we beg to differ
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on McKenzie’s assessment more generally, in the context of the current work all we
need to convince the reader of is that kinematical constraints as a category (just like
dynamical laws as a category) have been present, are present and are likely to be
present in our best future theories, and that this sort of meta-induction then rests
on acceptable footing. That this footing is solid, seems to follow from that (1) our
extrapolation rests on taking into account a whole convergence trend analogously to
how extrapolations work in science, and that (2) we usually accept extrapolations
in science of this kind too.45
3.4 Kinematical constraints, modal non-absolutism, and meta-
physically necessary laws
A theory’s kinematical constraints minimally—and in some sense thus definitionally—
characterise the systems it is supposed to model. They thereby form the basis of
any modelling of putative dynamical evolutions in the first place. Curiel [2011] puts
it as follows:
[physical] frameworks do not predict kinematical constraints; they de-
mand them. I take a prediction to be something that a theory, while
meaningfully and appropriately modelling a given system, can still get
wrong. Newtonian mechanics, then, does not predict that the kinemati-
cal velocity of a Newtonian body equal the temporal rate of change of its
position; rather it requires it as a precondition for its own applicability.
It can’t “get it wrong”. If the kinematical constraints demanded by a
theory do not hold for a family of phenomena, that theory cannot treat
it, for the system is of a type beyond the theory’s scope. (p. 12)
There is a quite natural way to understand the distinction between kinematical
and dynamical constraints in modal terms: Kinematical constraints give rise to a
stronger sort of necessity—or equivalently, constrain a broader space of possibilities.
There is a sense in which a physical system must evolve in the way prescribed by
dynamical laws; but the sense in which that system must conform to the relevant
kinematical constraints is a stronger one. Not only is the set of worlds in which the
dynamical laws hold a proper subset of the set of worlds in which the kinematical
laws hold. But more than that: The existence of a kinematic/dynamical distinction
strongly suggests that laws of nature may have two qualitatively distinct modal
45See Linnemann and Martens [2021] for an extended argument to this effect.
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statuses.46
How does this relate to our previous discussion of metaphysical accounts of
laws and their modal status? First of all, it gives an advantage to the non-
absolutist accounts of laws discussed in sections 1 and 2, such as our proposed
essentialist DTA view, over absolutist accounts: Unlike the former, the latter—on
which all laws have the same modal status (be it metaphysical necessity or mere
nomic necessity)—are simply not compatible with the modal divide suggested by
the kinematical/dynamical distinction. This is already an important point, given
the popularity that absolutist views still enjoy in metaphysical debates about laws.
Moreover, the kinematical/dynamical distinction provides non-absolutists with a
naturalistic criterion to determine, in practise, which law has which modal status.
For instance, relying on that distinction, the non-absolutist can give naturalistic
support—rather than the mostly intuition-based support it e.g. receives in Tahko
[2015]—to her claim that Coulomb’s law is necessary in a strictly weaker sense than
the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP): the former is a dynamical, the latter is a kine-
matical law. While it should be clear that Coulomb’s law is a dynamical law, the
case of the PEP is a bit more intricate. To realise this, first, recall that the PEP
states that “no two fermions in a closed system can occupy the same quantum state
at the same time" (Tahko [2015], p. 514). Its generalisation—the spin-statistics
connection—says that (1) fermions obey Bose-Einstein statistics, and (2) bosons
obey Dirac-Fermi statistics; the fact that fermions obey Bose-Einstein statistics is
a technical statement that importantly implies that no two fermions can have the
same state. Now, in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the Pauli-exclusion prin-
ciple and the spin-statistics connection more generally are brute principles; in this
context, we can only state that the principle is kinematical in so far as that it is
supposed to hold in all models qua brute principle. However, once considered in the
richer framework of quantum field theory, the spin-statistics connection becomes a
provable theorem. Interestingly, no single generally accepted formal framework of
QFT exists as of now. What can be said nevertheless then is that these proofs
of the spin-statistics theorems work with four basic types of premises, namely on
(i) some form of Lorentz invariance of the involved fields, (ii) the spectrum of
the Hamiltonian, (iii) causality, (iv) finite particle multiplicity, and—arguably of
46Note that an epistemic (or, more specifically, transcendentalist) interpretation of the
kinematical-dynamical distinction is possible as well: Curiel himself, for instance, makes the al-
lusion to kinematic constraints as a relativised a priori in the spirit of Reichenbach [1965], or
Friedman [2001]. Just as before where we dismissed a merely epistemic reading of Tahko’s law
account (see 7), we, however, only take interest in the more straightforward ontic reading (in other
words, we are interested in a project of naturalised, realist ontology).
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even more technical nature—(v) analyticity (see Swanson [2018]).47 Evidently, the
spin-statistics connection—including the Pauli exclusion principle as a corollary
thereof—can be identified as a kinematical statement if the premises of the proof
are of kinematical nature. This seems to be the case though: Notably, the re-
quirement of Lorentz-invariance here is just the general posit that field theoretical
objects are covariant/invariant under Lorentz-transformations; all other premises
are un-problematically kinematical in nature to begin with. In consequence then,
the spin-statistics theorem and thus the Pauli-exclusion principle again have to be
understood as kinematical.48
Up to now, we have seen that the kinematical/dynamical distinction tips the
balance in favour of non-absolutism over absolutism, and that it provides the former
kind of theory with a clear criterion to determine which laws have the stronger
and which laws have the weaker modal status. However, the non-absolutist views
considered earlier, in particular our own proposed view, do not only claim that there
are two modal statuses for laws—they make the further claim that the stronger
modal status is metaphysical necessity. And this further claim is not obviously
supported by the kinematical/dynamical distinction itself.
That the only two modal statuses at issue are those of nomic and of meta-
physical necessity is a shared assumption in metaphysical debates about laws of
nature and in particular in the debate this paper contributes to. According to that
assumption, the modal divide suggested by the kinematical/dynamical distinction
in physics does directly lend support to the sort of non-absolutist view considered
previously, on which the modally stronger laws are specifically metaphysically nec-
essary. But does this assumption itself also find some naturalistic support in the
kinematical/dynamical distinction? Is there reason to think that kinematical laws
are best understood as being metaphysically necessary, especially in the essentialist
sense assumed in our previous discussion—as opposed to having, say, just a higher
“grade” of nomic necessity than dynamical laws?49
Even if not the only possible one, a reading of kinematical laws as metaphysi-
cally necessary, as essential to the physical entities to which they apply, seems quite
plausible. Indeed, as the passage quoted above from Curiel [2016] may already
suggest, his discussion of kinematical constraints lends itself to such a reading.50
47An insightful heuristic treatment of such proofs is provided by Baez [2012]; an in-depth dis-
cussion by Bain [2016].
48Bain [Unknown] for instance arrives at the similar conclusion that the spin-statistics theorem
is kinematical in nature.
49See Lange [2009] for a view on which there are various grades of nomic necessity corresponding
to degrees of stability under counterfactual variation.
50It is important to emphasise that Curiel takes all of this to eventually speak in favour of a
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According to him, one main role that kinematical constraints, unlike the dynamics,
play in physical theory is that ‘they characterise the physical nature of systems the
theory treats, i.e., [they are] constitutive of the kind of system the theory treats’
(Curiel [2016], p. 9; emphasis added). The notions of nature and constitutive-
ness at play here may be interpreted in a purely semantical way — in terms of
the meanings of the physical terms involved (this is actually the view which Curiel
[2016] ultimately favours). However, his discussion also leaves room for a more on-
tological interpretation, which indeed suggests itself quite naturally: We may say
that the kinematical constraints capture those aspects of a system which make it
the sort of physical system it is according to the theory, paralleling almost exactly
the Aristotelian characterisation of essence as the ‘what it is to be’, or the ‘real
definition’ of an entity.51 Kinematical constraints in a physical theory hence play
exactly the same role which essential characteristics of entities play in metaphysical
theorising. Given the standard assumption that essentiality entails metaphysical
necessity (cf. Fine [1994]), this systematic parallel strongly suggests that kinemat-
ical constraints are metaphysically necessary. Note, moreover, that the idea that
kinematical aspects are essential to systems is compatible with our proposed take
on the ‘forms of the law problem’ in §2.1: remember that we suggested that the
relevant N-relation holds between some property F which singles out the relevant
type of system, and some property G which captures the behaviour of this system
through a functional relation of its first-order properties. This behaviour can, after
all, still be constitutive—if so, the law as a whole becomes metaphysically neces-
sary. For example, in the case of the putatively metaphysically necessary PEP, the
account offered in §2.1 maintains that F corresponds to the property of being a
closed system with two fermions, and G to the property of being such that there is
transcendentalist reading of kinematical constraints: Kinematical constraints are then constitutive
of physical theories in the narrower sense that they express the minimal preconditions relative to
which specific physical content can be meaningfully expressed and interpreted. As kinematical
constraints differ from theory to theory, this transcendentalist take on kinematical structure is
naturally related to the relativised a priori of Reichenbach [1965] and Friedman [2001] (as Curiel
stresses himself). Note that none of this here is a problem for our view as we are simply working
under the different proviso that current non-transcendentalist analytic metaphysics—naturalised
or not—is the right way to go; and as clearly the kinematical/distinction cannot settle the debate
on whether one can sensibly or not speak of the things in themselves, it is simply subject to
our general metaphysical leanings whether the kinematical/dynamical distinction supports a non-
absolutist law account or a transcendentalist reading. This being said, both options are of course
prima facie on the table; this paper only explores one out of the two. A detailed exploration of the
kinematical/dynamical distinction and of theory interpretation in physics from a transcendentalist
position more generally is arguably Curiel [2020].
51This characterisation goes back to Aristotle, see his Metaphysics Z.4 for the ‘what it is to
be’-formulation and Topics 102a3 for the link to definition. The latter aspect in particular has
been stressed in the context of contemporary essentialism by Fine [1994].
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some difference in the quantum numbers of the two fermions.
Let us be clear about what our argument here is. Our starting point is that there
is an explanatory need which can be met by an adequate non-absolutist theory of
the laws of nature. We propose an ontological reading of Curiel’s characterization of
the kinematical/dynamical distinction, according to which kinematical laws express
essential truths. We have made it plausible that this is a viable reading, but also
pointed out that it is not the only one available. We have also argued that if
this reading is adopted, then kinematical laws are metaphysically necessary (by the
implication from essence to metaphysical necessity). This together with the points
made earlier in the paper gives us an abductive argument for our proposed reading:
There is a need for an non-absolutist theory of the laws of nature. Such a theory has
to meet certain constraints. We have introduced three such constraints in §1.2 and
then argued in §2.3 that the essentialist DTA theory meets them. But to bolster
our argument, two further constraints should be mentioned.
First, making an earlier requirement more explicit, the theory should be natu-
ralistic, in the sense that it if informed by science to a sufficient degree, and second,
it should furthermore provide us with a workable criterion for distinguishing the
metaphysically necessary from the metaphysically contingent laws of nature. Re-
garding the latter constraint, we have recently argued that the criterion provided
by Tahko is inadequate, which means that non-absolutists need to look elsewhere.
(See Hirèche et al. [2021].) The essentialist DTA theory by itself does not meet the
two further requirements, but it can do so if combined with the proposed criterion
for the metaphysical necessity of the laws based on the kineamtical/dynamical dis-
tinction: the theory on its own gives us a metaphysical explanation of why some
laws are metaphysically necessary (because they hold in virtue of the nature/essence
of some universals) and the ontic reading of the kinematical/dynamical distinction
adds a naturalistic and workable criterion for the metaphysical necessity of laws
which allows us to determine which laws have this special modal status. It should
hence be clear that our argument for the ontic reading of the distinction is abduc-
tive; in the given dialectical context it provides a crucial part of the best available
explanation, i.e. of an adequate non-absolutist theory of the laws of nature which
both explains why some laws are metaphysically necessary and also allows us to
determine which those laws are.52
Coming back to a point which has been raised at the beginning of this sec-
tion, there remains one property of kinematical constraints which appears to un-
dermine our claim that the kinematical laws are metaphysically necessary, namely
52We thank an anonymous referee for pushing us to clarify this aspect of our argument.
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their theory-relativity. After all, like metaphysical necessity, essence is a theory-
independent notion: The essence of an entity consists in what it is to be that entity,
and this is, essentialists believe, not determined by any theory about the entity, but
rather an objective fact which obtains independently of what any theory, physical or
of any other kind, says. Does this standard assumption about essence then threaten
the two-fold thesis developed in this subsection, the thesis that physical laws which
express kinematical constraints express essential truths and therefore metaphysical
necessities?
That a kinematical constraint is theory-relative may mean different things, which
may have different implications for our thesis. Kinematical constraints play a con-
stitutive role concerning the type of system a physical theory is about, which gives
us a first, wholly unproblematic sense in which they are theory-relative: Kinemati-
cal constraints are specific to the theory (and interpretation) to which they belong,
which is of course compatible with them being absolutely, essentially, and meta-
physically necessarily true. Theory-specificity in this sense is a matter of being tied
to a theory which describes certain aspects of (physical) reality and may remain
silent about others. From an essentialist perspective, the theory may hence not
capture all physical aspects of the relevant system’s essence, but still some of them.
Picking up where the general discussion of section 3.1 left off, this specificity
of kinematical constraints could, however, turn out to conflict with our thesis in
the following two kinds of cases: First, cases in which there are distinct (correct)
physical theories which differ in whether at least one law expresses a kinematical
constraint on the very same system. In cases of this kind, our thesis would seem to
entail that this law both holds and fails to hold with metaphysical necessity, which
is of course contradictory. Second, cases in which a theory is replaced by another
one in which at least one law falls on the other side of the kinematical/dynamical
distinction compared to the previous theory. In cases of this kind, our thesis would
also seem to have the same problematic implication.
Again, the most straightforward and metaphysically conservative response to
these two problem cases says that our thesis is only meant to apply to the laws
of a unique, final physical theory (at least for a particular domain). Only those
laws which belong to the kinematical structure of this final theory express meta-
physical necessities. If this final theory exclusively covers its domain, neither of
the two problem cases can arise and the tension between the fact that kinematical
constraints are always kinematical constraints of a particular theory, and the meta-
physical standard view that essence is absolute is resolved. The main drawback
of the response is, again, that based on the current state of physics, this response
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may be seen as involving a (heavy) idealization about scientific progress. After all,
while we can of course currently hope that we will at some point in time arrive at
a unique, final physical theory, we neither have a guarantee that science will ever
get there, nor can we make warranted assertions about the content of this theory.
According to this response strategy, our appeal to particular examples of laws, in-
cluding the recurring contrasting examples of the PEP and Coulomb’s law and all
other examples given in this section, would have to be seen as merely tentative.
Whether any of these really turn out to be metaphysically necessary laws of nature
could, after all, only be settled based on whether they are laws of a final physical
theory, a theory which we might not have or at least not know to have.
The second, metaphysically more revisionary response we mentioned in §3.1 has
the advantage of allowing us to take current physical theories at their face-value: Its
main idea is to match the theory-relativity of the kinematical/dynamical distinction
on the side of essence: Entities have essences, but these essences are theory-relative.
As a result, the claims we make about the metaphysical necessity of physical laws
can be taken at their face value: We can hence assert, e.g. that the PEP expresses
an essential truth about closed physical systems containing fermions (and about the
N -relation) relative to certain quantum mechanical theories.
The idea to relativize essence to a theory can be considered unorthodox, espe-
cially from the perspective of the dominant Neo-Aristotelian approach to essence
made popular by Fine, Lowe, Correia and others,53 but it is not wholly without
precedent. Lewis has famously suggested that what counts as essential to an entity
is highly context-dependent (cf. Lewis [1986], p. 252) and Paul has developed a
matching context-dependent theory of essence (cf. Paul [2004]. On a different sort
of relativist view, essence is explanation-relative, namely relative to an explanatory
framework (see Sullivan [2017]).
A metaphysically revisionary account along these lines could perhaps be adapted
to deliver a theory-relative notion of essence. Another metaphysically revisionary
strategy would consist in amending the Finean-approach to essence which we rely
on in this paper to incorporate a relativized notion of essentiality; one would have to
either adopt a matching relativized notion of metaphysical necessity in addition (cf.
Hirèche [2020], Hirèche [2021], §2.1), or develop a workable account of the connection
between relativized essentiality and an absolute notion of metaphysical necessity.
Spelling out the metaphysically revisionary accounts further is beyond the pale of
this paper, so we provisionally adopt the first metaphysically non-revisionary reply
as our official response here. In any case, we may conclude that, given the existence
53See e.g. Correia [2012], Fine [1994], Lowe [2018].
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of workable ways to rule out problem cases arising from the theory-relativity of
kinematical constraints, the ‘theory-relativity’ worry does not pose a serious threat
to the essentialist DTA account.54
4 Conclusion
Contemporary physics gives us reason to doubt the absolutist dogma propagated by
the three dominant philosophical theories of laws of nature. Essentialist DTA gives
us a non-absolutist theory of the laws—a theory which allows for both metaphys-
ically contingent and necessary laws of nature—which is immune to the problems
which plague two existing non-absolutist theories respectively proposed by Tahko,
and by Hendry and Rowbottom. In particular, it meets the three crucial explana-
tory challenges for such theories which we have set out in this paper: First, it posits
essence as the only source of necessity and explains the mere nomic necessity of
the laws by defining this notion as a relativized notion of metaphysical necessity.
Second, this also allows the theory to avoid the synchronization problem faced by
a two-sources view, since it follows from the adopted definition of nomic necessity
that metaphysically necessary laws are also nomically necessary. Third, the theory
relies on Armstrong’s N -relation as a distinct marker of laws of nature, allowing it
to avoid the ‘disjunctification’ of the notion of a law which Bartels identified as a
likely pitfall for non-absolutist views. We have furthermore argued that essentialist
DTA can seamlessly be combined with a plausible criterion for distinguishing meta-
physically necessary from metaphysically contingent laws of physics which draws
on the distinction between kinematical and dynamical structure found in contem-
porary physical theories. Essentialist DTA hence gives us a theory of the laws of
nature which, with respect to physics, meets naturalistic demands and at the same
time improves on existing non-absolutist theories of the laws of nature.
54The alternative approach advocated in Bartels [1996], §2 mentioned in footnote 40) again
promises to offer a middle way: If essence is relativized to an explanatory project instead of
to a specific theory and if such explanatory projects comprise a succession of ever more precise
theories with the same explanatory goals, the kinematical constraints of a theory, and with them
the essential truths they express about physical systems, are refined, not exchanged as we progress
through this succession. Essence and metaphysical necessity are hence still relativized, but in a
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Appendix: The omnipresence of the kinematical/dynamical
distinction
In this appendix, we describe the presence of the kinematical/dynamical across
various spacetime theories, including our currently best spacetime theory (GR),
and a candidate for our future best spacetime theory (canonical quantum gravity).
Newton-Cartan theory In the Newton-Cartan framework (‘geometrised Newto-
nian gravity’)55, (A) a spacetime is characterised as the tuple (M, tab, hab,∇a)
where
(i) M is a smooth, connected, four-dimensional differentiable man-
ifold; (ii) tab is a smooth, symmetric, covariant tensor field on M
of signature (1, 0, 0, 0); (iii) hab is a smooth, symmetric, contravari-
ant tensor field on M of signature (0, 1, 1, 1); (iv) ∇a is a smooth
derivative operator onM ; and (v) the following two conditions hold:
[...]habtbc = 0
[...]∇atbc = 0 and ∇ahbc = 0
(Malament [2012], p. 249.)
55It is worth stressing in light of certain misconceptions earlier readers of our manuscript have
had that the Newton-Cartan framework, albeit in no sense as well-known as the standard force-
formulation of Newtonian gravity, is generally favoured in precise foundationalist considerations
of ‘Newtonian’ gravity. In this respect, see, for instance, the seminal work by Ehlers [1981/2019]
on the correspondence relationship between Newtonian gravity and general relativity.
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The conditions stated in the last two rows are called the “orthogonality" and
“compatibility" condition, respectively. In other words, the kinematical set-up
as a whole in terms of h and t fields is further restricted by the two kinematical
constraints (v).
Compare this to a narrower conception of classical spacetime according to
which a (B) classical spacetime in addition has to be time-orientable, i.e., a
classical spacetime is characterized as the tuple (M, tab, hab,∇a, {ζa}) where
{ζa} denotes an equivalence class of time orientations. The signature of tab
implies that (vi) there is a covariant vector ta (unique up to sign) such that
tab = tatb. Here, (vi) is a derived kinematical constraint as it is uniquely (up to
isomorphism) induced from the kinematical constraint that there is a class of
time orientable vector fields. Prima facie, both (A) and (B) seem to be sensible
conceptions of spacetime models—why not think of the more restrictive (B)
as the kinematical structure rather than just of the structure designated by
(A) then? One argument to be made is that (A) might already be sufficiently
restrictive for identifying spacetime structure given the background knowledge
from general relativistic spacetime contexts that global time orientability is
not at all necessary (as opposed to local time orientability) for a spacetime-
object56—depending on whether or not we interpret the formalism on the
basis of this background knowledge.57
This case then forcefully illustrates how the exact boundary between kinemat-
ical and dynamical structure depends on how we interpret the formalism be-
hind a specific physical theory—in particular on the presupposed background
knowledge through which the theory is interpreted—and thus underlines that
the kinematical/dynamical distinction cannot be read out purely formally.
General relativity In general relativity (GR), a spacetime is characterised by the
tuple (M, gab) where M is a four-dimensional differentiable manifold, and g a
Lorentzian metric. Prior to the actual dynamical equations of motion for the
metric field—the Einstein field equations—various sorts of constraints can be
imposed on the set of allowed spacetimes. Note that, for instance, a similar
ambiguity as to whether or not a spacetime has to be time-orientable arises as
56An example is the black hole spacetime of Kerr-Newman spacetime which despite lack of
global time-orientability counts as a perfectly understandable spacetime structure.
57The ontological interpretation of physical theories—how is the formalism linked to the
world?—takes into account contextual considerations (such as the formalism’s limit relation to
other theories qua formalisms) as well as external metaphysical principles (like the idea of primi-
tive ontology), and insights—in all cases provided doing so is justified on a sufficiently naturalist
basis (as for instance usually established through meta-induction).
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in Newton-Cartan theory above. Independently of such quarrels, an example
of a derivative kinematical constraint straightforwardly arises from the mere
choice of the metric field g as a configurative variable: “every neighbourhood
in every model spacetime admits coordinates (at least locally) in which the
component of the scalar density [namely, [
√
−g]] has a value of −1" (Pitts
[2006], p. 95).58
Canonical quantum gravity Non-perturbative canonical quantisation of gravity
takes in a Hamiltonian description of GR; this means that GR, first of all,
needs to be constrained to its 3+1/ADM/formulation, that is formulated as
a dynamical evolution of the metric constrained to a space-like surface Σ.59,60
The presentation of canonical quantisation of GR in ADM formalism and
Ashtekar-Barbero variables—quantising this choice of variables is sometimes
called quantum geometry—closely follows Wüthrich [2006].




tonian density H = √q(NC+NaVa) where C := −(3)R+ q−1πabπab− 12q
−1π2,
and Va := −2Db(q−1/2πab). Here, qab is the three-metric, q the determinant
of qab, (3)R is the 3-dimensional scalar curvature, πab the canonical momen-
tum, π = πaa := πabqab, Da is the unique torsion-free covariant derivative
operator on Σ associated with the three metric qab, and N and Na are re-
spectively the lapse function and the shift vector central to the ADM for-
mulation. The Hamiltonian H is decomposes into an orthogonal component




qNC ≈ 0, which vanishes if the equations of motion
for N are imposed (C is called the ‘Hamiltonian constraint’), and a paral-





qNaVa which vanishes when the
(formally dubbed) ‘equations of motion’ for Na are imposed (V a are called
the ‘spatial diffeomorphism constraints’). N and Na can respectively be seen
to act as Lagrange multipliers.61 C(N) and V(Na) together form an algebra
named Dirac algebra, which is schematically of the following form:
58See also Read [2016], p. 22; inspired by Read’s terminology, we can think of absolute objects
(objects which up to isomorphism stay the same in all kinematical models), and confined objects
(objects which are always the same) as kinematical structure.
59See, for instance, Wald [2010], chapter 10, in particular section 10.2, for a textbook treatment.
60The 3+1-formulation can only be applied to spacetimes which are homeomorphic (topologi-
cally isomorphic) to R× Σ.
61That the Hamiltonian vanishes upon imposing all the constraints it is made of is known as
the problem of time. See Anderson [2012].
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{V ,V} ∝ V ,
{V , C} ∝ C,
{C, C} ∝ V .
The constraints are so-called first-class constraints, that is, their mutual Pois-
son brackets vanish when the constraints are imposed. The canonical commu-
tation relations are {qab(x), πcd(y)} ∝ δ3c(aδ3db)(x, y), and {qab(x), qcd(y)} =
{πab(x), qcd(y)} = 0.
Standard canonical quantum gravity straightforwardly quantises this Dirac al-
gebra using Dirac’s method of constrained quantisation; canonical loop quan-
tum gravity analogously quantises the extended Dirac algebra obtained after
a change to Ashtekar variables through the same method.62 The general pro-
cedure runs as follows:63
• Find a space of functionals K to represent the operators corresponding
to the canonical variables.
• Impose all constraint equations apart from the Hamiltonian constraint
onto K, that is, the constraints related to the parallel component of the
Hamiltonian. The space of solutions provides a subspaceM⊂ K. Find
an inner product for turningM into a Hilbert space. (Alternatively, find
a suitable inner product for K which can then be inherited byM.) The
resulting Hilbert space is called the kinematical Hilbert space Hkin. It is
the space obtained through realising all kinematical constraint equations.
This step thus amounts to imposing kinematical constraints.
• Impose the Hamiltonian constraint. The resulting Hilbert space is called
the ‘physical Hilbert space Hphy’.
All expectation values for evolution between two ‘slices’ of spacetime can now
be calculated through forming the inner product of states in Hphy. It is worth
noting that, after quantisation, states in the kinematical Hilbert space are
usually re-expressed in the so-called spin network representation.
62This method can be used, since the constraints are all first-order. It goes back to Dirac [2001].
63For simplicity, assume a Schrödinger-type representation where states are given by function-
als, and operators by functional operators on these functionals, and generously ignore domain
questions.
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We can make the following observations on kinematical constraints: (1) The
conditions literally dubbed ‘kinematical constraints’ here (there are others
prior to them, such as resulting from choosing a 3 + 1 split in the first place)
are prior to the dynamical constraint impositions. (2) However, it is not
unthinkable to solve first the dynamical constraints and then the so-called
kinematical constraints. (Generally speaking, ‘fixing gauge’, and ‘imposing
dynamics’ commute.) (3) It is because one wants to know the kinematical
states (and also because one can practically achieve this) that one is already
interested in the kinematical Hilbert space. (4) If one had solved the dynami-
cal constraints first, it would be the dynamics of a much more general theory
with much more general states whose meaning we would presumably not un-
derstand (what systems would they refer to?) than that of the kinematical
Hilbert space for which we have solved the kinematical albeit not the dynam-
ical constraints. Crudely speaking, kinematics is essential for knowing what
we are talking about, dynamics for knowing how what we are talking about
evolves.
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